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ARTICLES
WHO REPRESENTS THE CORPORATION? IN SEARCH OF
A BETTER METHOD FOR DETERMINING THE
CORPORATE INTEREST IN DERIVATIVE SUITSt

Franklin A. Gevurtz*
Shareholderderivative suits present problems in determining who should represent the
interests of the corporation. The plaintiffshareholderis responsiblefor bringing the action,
but the cause ofaction belongs to the company. The corporatemanagement, who would normally make the decision, is usually named as a defendant. In this Article, Professor Gevurtz
reviews the current methods used to determine the best interests of the corporation andargues
that the corporateinterest is not properlyprotected when any one of the current contendersthe boardof directors,the plaintiffshareholder,the courts, or all the shareholders-makethe
litigation decisions in a derivativesuit. This Article proposes as an alternative that, once a
derivative suit is filed, the court appoint a provisional litigaiion panel to make all future
decisions regardingthe action. The court-appointedpanel of neutral third parties, charged
with the responsibilityof representingthe corporateinterest in litigation,is a potential solution
to the dilemma: Who represents the corporation?
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WHO REPRESENTS THE CORPORATION?

In any lawsuit the plaintiff must make a number of decisions including whether to initiate the suit, to dismiss, or to settle. Some prospective plaintiffs, infants and the insane, for example, are incapable
of making these decisions for themselves. The same is true of the
corporation. Normally this poses no problem, because the corporation's board of directors or officers acting under the board's authority
are empowered to decide for the company whether and how to pursue
a possible claim through litigation.' Difficulty arises, however, when
the corporation's claim is against some or all of its directors. If current management were exclusively permitted to decide whether the
company should sue, many legitimate claims against the directors for
violations of their duties to the company would never be brought.
The solution to this problem lies in the existence of the derivative
2
suit. Through such actions, individual shareholders are permitted to
1. United Copper Sec. Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U.S. 261 (1917); Findley v. Garrett, 109 Cal. App. 2d 166, 240 P.2d 421, 425-26 (1952); Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779
(Del. 1981). Occasionally, questions occur over the authority of officers to initiate litigation when
the board is deadlocked. See West View Hills, Inc. v. Lizau Realty Corp., 6 N.Y.2d 344, 189
N.Y.S.2d 863, 160 N.E.2d 622 (1959); Rothman & Schneider, Inc. v. Beckerman, 2 N.Y.2d 493, 161
N.Y.S.2d 118, 141 N.E.2d 610 (1957); Sterling Indus., Inc. v. Ball Bearing Pen Corp., 298 N.Y. 483,
84 N.E.2d 790 (1949).
2. From time to time, it is fashionable to question the desirability of derivative litigation. Recently, one commentator went so far as to advocate its abolition. Comment, Shareholders'Derivative
Suits and Shareholders' Welfare: An Evaluation and A Proposal,77 Nw. U.L. REV. 856 (1983). A
detailed reply to the suggestion is beyond the scope of this Article. Suffice it to say that many
derivative suits have produced substantial and apparently worthwhile recoveries for the companies
involved. See Jones, An Empirical Examination of the Resolution of Shareholder Derivative and
Class Action Lawsuits, 60 B.U.L. REV. 542 (1980); Hornstein, New Aspects of Stockholders' Deriva-
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'sue on behalf of the corporation. While the corporation is named as a4
defendant in the suit, 3 the cause of action asserted is the company's, 5
and, with rare exceptions, any recovery must go to the company.
Hence, the corporation is the true, if rather helpless, plaintiff.6 The
plaintiff shareholder serves merely as a self-appointed champion of
the corporate right.7 As with most champions, the plaintiff shareholder (or, more precisely, his or her attorney) expects a handsome
reward for the effort.
As is evident from this scenario, determining the corporation's
interest in a derivative suit raises its own problems. After balancing
the costs of litigating against the possible gains, it may or may not be
in the corporation's interest to pursue a suit, even a meritorious one,
against its management. If the suit is pursued, at some point it may in
the company's interest to dismiss or to settle. Who should make these
decisions on behalf of the corporation? Current practice is to delegate
the decisionmaking to one of four parties.
8
First, courts have attempted to preserve a role for the directors.
Naturally, if all the directors are involved in active wrongdoing at the
expense of the corporation, no one would suggest that they still be
allowed to determine the company's interest in pressing a claim
against themselves. However, if, as is common, only some of the directors are accused of active wrongdoing, the question becomes
whether the untainted directors can determine the corporation's interest in pursuing a suit against their colleagues.
The second alternative is to leave decisions in the hands of the
plaintiff shareholder, at least once it is determined that the board cannot fulfill its usual role. Normally, a plaintiff who brings an action is
entitled to control it. 9 However, a derivative suit will not result in a
tive Suits, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1947). Thus, despite theoretical arguments about the efficacy of
economic forces or personal integrity in preventing misconduct by directors and officers, the empirical data indicates that, at least in some cases, misconduct occurs and the corporate interest is served
by derivative litigation.
3. H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES § 369 (3d ed. 1983).
4. Ross v. Bernard, 396 U.S. 531, 538-39 (1970).
5. Keenan v. Eshleman, 2 A.2d 904, 912-13 (Del. 1938).
6. Koster v. Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co., 330 U.S. 518 (1947).
7. See Cohen v. Beneficial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 549 (1949).
8. See infra text accompanying notes 15-30.
9. See Manufacturers Mut. Fire Ins. Co. of R.I. v. Hopson, 176 Misc. 220, 25 N.Y.S.2d 502,
505-07 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1940), aft'd,262 App. Div. 731, 29 N.Y.S.2d 139 (1941), affd, 288 N.Y. 668,
43 N.E.2d 71 (1942).
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direct recovery by the plaintiff shareholder, and the indirect benefit to
the value of his or her stock will typically not be significant. Given
the lack of any individual recovery, an examination of the motivations
of shareholders for bringing derivative suits is in order. One is led to
question whether these motives can result in any conflict between the
interests of the plaintiff shareholder and those of the corporation.
If directors or plaintiff shareholders suffer from a conflict of interest, it is tempting to turn to the courts for a neutral judgment. For
some years, this approach has been taken with respect to the settlement of derivative actions by requiring courts to approve the settlement agreement. 1° More recently, the Delaware Supreme Court
announced that the courts of that state could also use their judgment
to determine whether a derivative suit should be dismissed when faced
with such a recommendation by a committee of so-called disinterested
directors.1 ' This approach, permitting an independent judicial determination, has been picked up and expanded in the American Law
Institute's Principlesof Corporate Governance and Structure: Restatement and Recommendations (Tentative Draft No. 1).12 Courts, however, typically exercise their judgment through adversarial
proceedings. This may not be a sensible way to make a decision the
purpose of which is to avoid exposing the corporation to burdensome
litigation. Moreover, in the case of a settlement, when all the parties
before the court are usually on one side of the issue, there may be
questions as to the adequacy of judicial review.
The fourth solution sometimes employed is to leave the decision
to a vote of the shareholders as a whole. 13 After all, it is their money
which is ultimately at stake. Practically speaking, however, this solution poses some obvious problems.
Part II of this Article will review the current approaches. It is
the thesis of this Article that none of these alternatives makes use of
an acceptable party to determine the corporate interest in a derivative
suit. Part III will then explore a new alternative. It will propose that
10. Rule 23.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires judicial approval of any settlement or voluntary dismissal of a derivative suit pending in federal court. Over 20 states have statutes or rules containing a similar provision. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND
STRUCTURE: RESTATEMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 7.04 comment b (Tent. Draft No. 1)

(American Law Institute 1982) [hereinafter cited as ALI Draft Principles]. Other states have imposed the requirement by judicial decision. E.g., Whitten v. Dabney, 171 Cal. 621, 154 P. 312
(1915).
11. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981).
12. ALI Draft Principles, supra note 10, § 7.03c.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 218-30.
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after a derivative suit is filed, the court appoint a panel of provisional
litigation directors whose function it will be to speak for the company
during the action. This proposal can best assure that a lawsuit
designed for the benefit of the corporation truly serves that entity's

interest. 14

II. A
A.

REVIEW OF CURRENT CONTENDERS

The Board of Directors

The board of directors (or officers to whom it has delegated that
authority) will normally decide whether or not a corporation should
initiate a lawsuit, dismiss it once begun, or agree to settle with the
defendants. Making these litigation decisions is part of the board's
overall managerial responsibility. Therefore, the question is not
whether, as a general rule, the directors can determine the corporation's interest in pursuing litigation-they do so most of the time with
no challenge. Rather, the issue here is under what circumstances
should the directors be displaced from making these decisions.
The present approach to resolving this issue is rather circuitous.
The law starts by requiring the plaintiff shareholder to allege what
14. Some commentators conceive the purpose of derivative suits as primarily to deter future
wrongdoing by corporate fiduciaries rather than to compensate the company for specific past
wrongs. Coffee & Schwartz, The Survival of the Derivative Suit: An Evaluation and A Proposalfor
Legislative Reform, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 261, 302-09 (1981). Taken to an extreme, this premise
could be used to suggest the irrelevance of the corporation's interest in a given derivative action. Id.
at 308. As is evident, this writer takes a different view.
In the article cited above, Professors Coffee and Schwartz raise three objections to the "compensatory rationale" for derivative litigation. These are: (1) that the identity of many shareholders will
change between the time of the wrongdoing and the time of recovery; (2) that the change in value of
the company's shares may differ from the amount either of its loss or its recovery; and (3) that the
amount of corporate recovery on a per share basis is typically de minimis. Id. at 302-05. Thus,
Professors Coffee and Schwartz conclude that derivative suits do an imperfect job of compensating
individual shareholders for any loss. This may well be true, but it is also irrelevant. These same
three factors exist with any lawsuit a corporation may file, including an ordinary breach of contract
action which management may have the company assert against an outsider. See Armstrong v.
Frostie Co., 453 F.2d 914 (4th Cir. 1971). Professors Coffee and Schwartz are confusing compensation of the corporation, which they casually dismiss as a bare fiction, and compensation of individual
shareholders, who normally have no separate rights in corporate assets including any cause of action
the company may assert.
Moreover, the question whether derivative litigation serves primarily to deter or to compensate
is really not the issue. As Professors Coffee and Schwartz realize, it does both. See also ALI Draft
Principles, supra note 10, pt. 7, ch. 1, at 232-40. The real question is to what extent the goal of
deterrence should be used to justify ignoring the corporate interest in derivative suits. Barring a
specific legislative mandate (as under Section 16(b) of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act), the answer
is that it should not. See infra text accompanying notes 163-64.
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efforts he or she made before filing the complaint to demand action
from the board or to state reasons why such a demand should be excused. 15 Several excuses have commonly been advanced. The most
obvious one exists when the directors are accused of wrongdoing,
thereby making such a request seemingly futile since the directors are
unlikely to vote to sue themselves. 16 A similar conflict of interest
arises when the directors would be asked to sue a person or entity

with whom they have a significant personal or financial relationship. 17
A third ground is to allege that the directors are under the control of
the defendants.1 8 Finally, when the directors have already indicated
their inalterable opposition to the suit, it can be argued that a demand
would be futile.1 9

The determination whether the plaintiff must make a demand
upon the directors does not resolve the question whether board decisionmaking should be displaced. In itself, this step serves simply as
what might be deemed a harmless, if usually pointless, intracorporate
courtesy. The burden of contacting the directors is, with rare exception, minimal, and it gives the board an opportunity to do what the
plaintiff is claiming is in the best interest of the company. 20 Therefore, a court may reasonably require prior demand upon the board
even in a case in which the court will allow the derivative suit to
15. In federal courts, this requirement is found in FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1. A number of states
have similar court rules or impose the requirement by statute. H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra
note 3, §§ 364, 365. This includes Delaware (DEL. CH. Cr. R. 23.1), California (CAL. CORP. CODE
§ 800(b)(2) (West 1982)) and New York (N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 626(c) (McKinney 1963)). Still,
other states impose the requirement by judicial decision. E.g., Bartlett v. New York, New Haven &
Hartford R.R., 221 Mass. 530, 109 N.E. 452 (1915).
16. E.g., Lewis v. Curtis, 671 F.2d 779 (3d Cir. 1982); Liboff v. Wolfson, 437 F.2d 121 (5th
Cir. 1971); Meltzer v. Atlantic Research Corp., 330 F.2d 946 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 841
(1964); Barr v. Wackman, 36 N.Y.2d 371, 368 N.Y.S.2d 497, 329 N.E.2d 180 (1975). If only a
minority of the board members are accused of wrongdoing, however, a demand is not necessarily
futile. See Untermeyer v. Fidelity Daily Income Trust, 580 F.2d 22 (1st Cir. 1978) (no demand
required when half of the board was accused). Moreover, some courts have required demand despite
all or a majority of the board being named as defendants.
17. E.g., Delaware & H. Co. v. Albany & S.R.R., 213 U.S. 435 (1909) (interlocking directorates); Phillips v. Bradford, 62 F.R.D. 681 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (same).
18. E.g., deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 286 F. Supp. 809 (D. Colo. 1968), modified on other
grounds, 435 F.2d 1223 (10th Cir. 1970); Abbe v. Goss, 411 F. Supp. 923 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); In re
Penn Central Sec. Litig., 367 F. Supp. 1158 (E.D. Pa. 1973); McKee v. Rogers, 156 A. 191 (Del. Ch.
1931).
19. Nussbacher v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 518 F.2d 873, 879 (7th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 424 U.S. 928 (1976). See also Swanson v. Traer, 354 U.S. 114 (1957).
20. Comment, The Demand and Standing Requirements in Stockholder Derivative Actions, 44
U. CHI. L. REv. 168 (1976). An unreasonable burden on the plaintiff shareholder might be created,
however, if the board was allowed an overly long period to respond to the demand.
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proceed if the board refuses to sue. 21 Conversely, going first to the
board may be excused as futile when the board has already registered
its opposition. Yet, this should not mean that the board's decision
22
will be disregarded.
What effect then should be given the board's refusal to sue either
in response to a demand or otherwise? To be consistent with the corporate norm of management by the board, the directors' decision
should be respected absent a conflict of interest or a failure by the
directors to act in good faith and with due care.2 3 This principle is
often referred to as the business judgment rule.2 4 While in these
broad terms the rule appears simple, its application to litigation decisions often poses considerable difficulty for the courts.
Most potential corporate claims are against parties unrelated to
the board of directors. Here, the situation should be straightforward.
No conflict of interest exists, and the chance of bad faith is remote.
Some cases raise the potential for a challenge based on what could be
considered a failure to exercise due care. This might occur when the
claim is so strong and so large that reasonable directors could not
26
refuse to sue25 or when the act of refusing to sue is, in itself, illegal.
21. E.g., Galef v. Alexander, 615 F.2d 51, 59 (2d Cir. 1980); Heit v. Baird, 567 F.2d 1157,
1162 n.6 (1st Cir. 1977). But see Lewis v. Curtis, 671 F.2d 779 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 179
(1982).
22. See Swanson v. Traer, 354 U.S. 114 (1957); Nussbacher v. Continental Ill. Nat'l ]3ank &
Trust Co., 518 F.2d 873 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 928 (1976).
Unfortunately, a number of courts have apparently failed to appreciate this distinction fully.
For example, in Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 784 (Del. 1981), the court adopted a
different standard for reviewing the directors' decision against the suit depending on whether demand was required or excused. See also Abramowitz v. Posner, 672 F.2d 1025 (2d Cir. 1982). The
result is to give a procedural step an altogether unwarranted substantive impact.
23. E.g., United Copper See. Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U.S. 261 (1917); Hawes v.
City of Oakland, 104 U.S. 450 (1881); Ash v. IBM Inc., 353 F.2d 491 (3d Cir. 1965), cert. denied,
384 U.S. 927 (1966); Swanson v. Traer, 249 F.2d 854 (7th Cir. 1957); Issner v. Aldrich, 254 F. Supp.
696 (D. Del. 1966); Findley v. Garrett, 109 Cal. App. 2d 166, 240 P.2d 421, 426 (1952).
24. E.g., Galefv. Alexander, 615 F.2d 51, 58-59 (2d Cir. 1980); Issner v. Aldrich, 254 F. Supp.
696 (D. Del. 1966). The business judgment rule is the name given to the deferential treatment
accorded by courts to disinterested decisions of directors so long as they are made in good faith and
with due care. Not only does it apply to a refusal by disinterested directors to sue, but it applies to
any decision by a disinterested board, whether challenged retroactively in an attempt to hold directors liable for the consequences of the decision or prospectively in an attempt to prevent the decision
from being given effect. See generally Brown & Phillips, The Business Judgment Rule: Burks v.
Lasker and Other Recent Developments, 6 J. CORP. L. 453 (1981); Arsht, The Business Judgment
Rule Revisited, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 93 (1979); Lewis, The Business Judgment Rule and Corporate
Directors'Liability for Mismanagement, 22 BAYLOR L. REV. 157 (1970).
25. Epstein v. Schenck, 35 N.Y.S.2d 969 (Sup. Ct. 1939); Groel v. United Elec. Co., 70 N.J.
Eq. 616, 61 A. 1061 (N.J. Ch. 1905). See also Harris v. Pearsall, 190 N.Y.S. 61 (Sup. Ct. 1921)
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However, it is rare when no rational reason can be advanced for refusing to sue and rarer still when such a refusal is somehow an illegal act.
Thus, derivative litigation could be simplified with little loss by limiting its availability to suits against directors and parties related to
directors.
When the potential corporate claim is against one or more directors (or parties related to one or more directors), the courts have encountered much greater difficulty. The question is whether there
exists a conflict of interest which disables the board from determining
the corporation's interest. 27 The source of the difficulty rests on the

fact that a board is generally composed of more than one member. As
a result, it is often the case that a potential claim will exist against
some, but not all directors. 28 The issue then becomes whether the
"untainted" directors can be relied upon to determine the corporate
interest in a suit against their colleagues.
The simplest solution would be to disqualify the entire board
whenever there is a claim against any director. This is not, however,
the approach followed by the courts. When considering the refusal by
a board to sue, courts have generally accepted the decision of a so-

called disinterested majority, that is, those directors who are not defendants, under the control of the defendants, or subject to any other
tangible conflict of interest. 29 Within the last decade, a number of

courts have gone even further. They have dismissed derivative suits
based on the recommendations of committees comprised of nominally
disinterested directors even in cases where a majority of the board was
(directors held liable for failure to sue former directors who made imprudent loans and for obstructing a stockholders' suit against the former directors).
26. Miller v. AT&T, 507 F.2d 759 (3d Cir. 1974).
27. Lewis v. Curtis, 671 F.2d 779 (3d Cir. 1982); Galef v. Alexander, 615 F.2d 51 (2d Cir.
1980).
28. E.g., Lasker v. Burks, 404 F. Supp. 1172 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (five out of I1 directors sued);
deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 286 F. Supp. 809 (D. Colo. 1968), modified and afl'd, 435 F.2d
1223 (10th Cir. 1970) (two out of five directors sued); Issner v. Aldrich, 254 F. Supp. 696 (D. Del.
1966) (three out of 17 directors sued); Findley v. Garrett, 109 Cal. App. 2d 166, 240 P.2d 421 (1952)
(two out of 11 directors charged with active wrongdoing); Stepak v. Dean, 434 A.2d 388 (Del. Ch.
1981) (one out of three directors sued). Even when the claim is initially against all the directors, new
directors who are not defendants may be appointed or elected to the board. E.g., Lewis v. Anderson,
615 F.2d 778 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 869 (1980); Meltzer v. Atlantic Research Corp.,
330 F.2d 946 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 841 (1964).
29. Swanson v. Traer, 249 F.2d 854 (7th Cir. 1957); Issner v. Aldrich, 254 F. Supp. 696 (D.
Del. 1966); Findley v. Garrett, 109 Cal. App. 2d 166, 240 P.2d 421 (1952). Acceptance of the
"disinterested" majority's decision is predicated, of course, on their having acted in good faith and
with due care. See, e.g., Findley v. Garrett, 109 Cal. App. 2d 166, 240 P.2d 421, 427 (1952).
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implicated. 30 Unfortunately, the prospects for gamesmanship and
chaos created by these approaches suggest that sometimes the simplest solutions really are the best.
1. Defendant Directors
It seems too obvious to state that directors who are named as
defendants cannot be expected to determine the corporation's interest
uninfluenced by their own. Yet courts and commentators who wish
to preserve a role for "disinterested" directors have been forced to
rethink the obvious by a gambit they otherwise would open up to the
plaintiff. A rule which automatically disqualified any director named
as a defendant could (unless the directors are replaced) allow the
plaintiff to preclude a role for the board by the simple expedient of
30. E.g., Gaines v. Haughton, 645 F.2d 761 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1145 (1982);
Abbey v. Control Data Corp., 603 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1979); Genzer v. Cunningham, 498 F. Supp.
682 (E.D. Mich. 1980); Rosengarten v. IT&T, 466 F. Supp. 817 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979). In these cases, often all or at least a
majority of the directors were originally named as defendants. In an attempt to obtain a say on
whether the suit should continue, the boards appointed a committee of their members, usually labeled a "special litigation committee," to which they delegated the task of deciding what position the
corporation should take in the suit. With a few exceptions, these committees were composed of
directors who were not defendants, often because they were elected to the board after the suit was
filed. The committees invariably reached the conclusion that the suit was against the company's
interest and moved in its name to dismiss.
This committee procedure was first used in Lasker v. Burks, 404 F. Supp. 1172 (S.D.N.Y.
1975). Lasker ultimately reached the Supreme Court, which held that whether the federal courts
would dismiss a derivative suit based on the motion of a special litigation committee must be decided
in accordance with state law so long as there was no conflicting federal policy. Burks v. Lasker, 441
U.S. 471 (1979). This resulted in the federal courts being forced to guess at what the state courts
might do with a procedure none had ever considered. The results could be embarrassing. Compare
Maldonado v. Flynn, 485 F. Supp. 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), modified, 671 F.2d 729 (2d Cir. 1982) with
Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981).
When the state courts finally spoke, they split three ways. New York decided to follow the
federal courts' predictions and applied the business judgment rule to motions by committees of nominally disinterested directors. Thus, unless the plaintiff could prove that the committee was not
independent, had acted in bad faith, or had acted without due deliberation, the case would be dismissed. Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979). In Zapata
Corp. v. Maldonado, Delaware decided upon a different approach. First, the Zapata court placed the
burden of proof on the issues of independence, good faith, and due care on the committee, not the
plaintiff. More importantly, Zapata held that the trial court could use it own judgment as to
whether the suit served the corporation's interest. See infra text accompanying notes 142-44. Yet a
third approach is found in the recent opinion by the Supreme Court of Iowa in Miller v. Register &
Tribune Syndicate, Inc., 336 N.W.2d 709 (Iowa 1983). There, the court held that if a majority of the
board was accused of wrongdoing they lacked any power to delegate to a committee the job of
determining the corporate interest in the suit.
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suing all or most of its members. 31 Those directors who did not participate or profit in the purported wrongdoing may be alleged to have
breached their duty of care to the corporation by approving, acquiescing in, or not moving to correct the acts of the ones who did. 32 These
allegations may never be proved, yet the plaintiff will be able to continue the suit.
Frustrating as this result may be, no one has proposed a satisfac-

tory alternative. Least acceptable is the approach followed by some
courts which allows defendant directors to decide whether the suit
serves the corporation's interest so long as those directors did not
profit from the challenged acts. 33 Not only is this approach inconsis-

tent with the appearance (if not the reality) of justice, it is also difficult
to see how such a procedure can possibly result in realistically determining the corporation's interest. It makes no sense to assert that
defendants who did not profit in the challenged transaction can somehow be considered disinterested. 34 If a cause of action is stated

against the passive directors for not opposing the transaction, they
31. ALl Draft Principles, supra note 10, § 7.03 comment c. See also Lewis v. Graves, 701 F.2d
245, 249 (2d Cir. 1983); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984).
32. E.g., Lewis v. Graves, 701 F.2d 245 (2d Cir. 1983); Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880 (2d Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1498 (1983); Meltzer v. Atlantic Research Corp., 330 F.2d 946 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 841 (1964); Barr v. Wackman, 36 N.Y.2d 371, 329 N.E.2d 180, 369
N.Y.S.2d 497 (1975).
Barr v. Wackman provides a prototype case of this pleading. In Barr, the plaintiff alleged that
five directors of Talcott National Corporation (who were also its principal officers) agreed, in exchange for employment contracts and other personal consideration, to aid Gulf and Western Industries in acquiring Talcott on terms substantially less favorable to Talcott than a merger already
negotiated between the two companies. This plan was allegedly carried out through various actions
taken by Talcott's board, including abandonment of the merger, support of a less favorable tender
offer for Talcott's shares, and authorization of various employment contracts for the principal officers. The eleven outside directors of Talcott-who did not personally benefit from these transactions-were alleged to have failed to exercise due care in authorizing and approving them.
33. Lewis v. Anderson, 615 F.2d 778 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 869 (1980); Mills v.
Esmark, Inc., 544 F. Supp. 1275 (N.D. Ill. 1982). See also Lewis v. Graves, 701 F.2d 245 (2d Cir.
1983); Heit v. Baird, 567 F.2d 1157 (1st Cir. 1977); In re Kauffman Mut. Fund Actions, 479 F.2d
257 (lst Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 857 (1973).
Kauffman, Heit, and Lewis involved only the question of whether demand must be made upon a
board of directors, a majority of the members of which were accused of acquiescing in the wrongdoing. These cases, therefore, did not actually allow defendant directors to determine the fate of the
suit, since it would still be possible for the court to ignore the board's refusal. Indeed, this point was
noted in Heit. 567 F.2d at 1162 n.6. Given the time taken to appeal these cases, however, it seems to
be carrying things to an extreme to require demand solely to give the board a chance to sue but not
to defer to its decision. After all, the boards clearly knew about the litigation, and if they wanted to
pursue the actions, they could always have done so without any demand.
34. Lewis v. Anderson, 615 F.2d 778, 780 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 869 (1980).
See also Lewis v. Graves, 701 F.2d 245 (2d Cir. 1983).
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have a clear interest, financial and otherwise, in seeking dismissal. 35
In defense of these decisions, perhaps the courts viewed the allegations against the passive directors as without merit. 36 In that case,
the courts should at least dismiss the complaint against those directors before allowing them to exercise any judgment on the corporation's interest in pursuing the action against the remaining
defendants. Not only would this improve appearances, it might also
increase the chances of a somewhat disinterested determination. By
virtue of having the claims against them dismissed, the passive directors will be assured that they need not appear and defend themselves
if they vote to sue the purported active wrongdoers. Before the claim
is dismissed, however, the passive directors can never be sure they will
37
not remain defendants in the litigation or even be found liable.
Before becoming too optimistic of such a simple solution, however, one must examine whether the likely claims against the passive
directors are susceptible to early dismissal. Unless those claims can
be dismissed on the pleadings (or even on summary judgment), the
plaintiff will have succeeded in precluding the board from determining the corporation's interest in the lawsuit. After all, once the case is
tried, it is too late for the board to decide it was against the company's
interest to bring it.
A review of the duty of directors when faced with active wrongdoing by their colleagues is beyond the scope of this Article. However, it appears that a director's approval, acquiescence, or even
simple failure to act in the face of wrongdoing by other directors will
35. Galefv. Alexander, 615 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1980). Nor is this result changed by the availability of liability insurance for directors, as one court suggested. Walner v. Friedman, 410 F. Supp. 29
(S.D.N.Y. 1975). Such insurance policies typically contain coinsurance provisions and limitations
on the amount of coverage which still leave the directors financially at risk. See Hinsey, Lloyd's New
Policy Formfor Directorsand Officers Liability Insurance-An Analysis, 33 Bus. LAW. 1961 (1978).
Moreover, even if a finding of liability will not lead to immediate financial loss, the directors may
remain concerned about its effect on their reputations.
36. That was clearly the case in Findley v. Garrett, 109 Cal. App. 2d 166, 240 P.2d 421 (1952),
in which the court deferred to the decision of the passive directors not to sue only after concluding
that the allegations against those directors did not state a cause of action. The court in Aronson v.
Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 817 (Del. 1984), also expressed doubt whether the complaint against the directors stated a cause of action.
37. The ALI Draft Principles allows directors who are named as defendants to be considered
independent for purposes of determining the corporate interest in a derivative suit if the court finds
the claims against them are "without merit." ALI Draft Principles, supra note 10, § 7.03(3). It is
not clear, however, whether this finding must be made before the directors consider the suit. Also, if
no relief is sought against the defendant directors (see Klotz v. Consolidated Edison Co., 386 F.
Supp. 577 (S.D.N.Y. 1974)), then it should be unnecessary to dismiss the claims against them first.
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at least state a claim requiring further exploration at trial.38 The passive directors cannot justifiably claim ignorance of the actions of
others on the board. 39 This is especially true when, as is typical, the
alleged wrongdoing involves a fairly major corporate transaction
which the board approved. 40 Nor is it appropriate to favor the passive
41
directors because the alleged active wrongdoing is not yet proved. If
the claims of active misconduct can be dismissed on the pleadings or
on summary judgment, then the claims against the passive directors
can also be dismissed. If, however, the claims of active wrongdoing
are not susceptible to such early dismissal, then the plaintiff is entitled
to the assumption that there was misconduct as alleged when considering a motion to dismiss the duty of care claims against the passive
directors. 42 Finally, there has been a growing recognition of the need
43
for an increased emphasis on the monitoring function of the board.
It would seriously undermine the incentives for such monitoring if a
failure to act in the face of active wrongdoing by other directors does
not even state a cause of action.
Brief mention should be made of two other approaches put forward as a way to deal with this problem. A separate trial could be
conducted on the duty of care claims in order to determine the plaintiff's standing to bring the rest of the action. 44 This, however, would
still allow the plaintiff to supplant the board's judgment to the extent
of undertaking one expensive trial. Moreover, separate trials would
generally not be practical. Resolution of whether the passive directors breached their duty of care by inaction in the face of alleged
38. E.g., Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1498 (1983); De
Pinto v. Provident Sec. Life Ins. Co., 374 F.2d 37 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 822 (1967);
Meltzer v. Atlantic Research Corp., 330 F.2d 946 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 841 (1964); Heit
v. W.H. Bixby, 276 F. Supp. 217 (E.D. Mo. 1967); Lutz v. Boas, 39 Del. Ch. 585, 171 A.2d 381
(1961); Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 87 N.J. 14, 432 A.2d 814 (1981); Barr v. Wackman, 36
N.Y.2d 371, 329 N.E.2d 180, 368 N.Y.S.2d 497 (1975).
39. Cf Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125 (Del. 1963).
40. See Lewis v. Graves, 701 F.2d 245, 248 (2d Cir. 1983).
41. This appears to have been the attitude taken by the court in Heit v. Baird, 567 F.2d 1157
(lst Cir. 1977). Casting aside allegations that a sale of stock on favorable terms to three inside
directors was undertaken to maintain the current management's control, the court speculated that
the transaction "may have served any number of entirely proper corporate purposes." 567 F.2d at
1161.
42. See Barr v. Wackman, 36 N.Y.2d 371, 329 N.E.2d 180, 368 N.Y.S.2d 497 (1975).
43. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 302
(TENT. DRAFT No. 2) (American Law Institute 1984); M. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE

CORPORATION, 162-68 (1976); ABA, Section of Corporation and Business Law, Committee on Corporate Laws, CorporateDirector's Guidebook, 33 Bus. LAW. 1591, 1621 (1978).
44. See Comment, supra note 20, at 198-200.
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wrongdoing will almost inevitably require exploration of the purported wrongdoing. 45 As a result, separate trials will only lead to duplication and waste.
Another procedure was recently adopted by the Delaware
Supreme Court in Aronson v. Lewis. 46 It instructed the Chancery
Court to require that demand be made unless the allegations against
the directors create a "reasonable doubt" whether they are protected
from liability by the business judgment rule. The probable result of
this decision will be confusion. If the plaintiff does not allege facts
which, if proved, establish the inapplicability of the business judgment
rule, then the complaint can be dismissed on the merits regardless of
whether demand was made.47 If, however, the plaintiff pleads such
facts, then it is impossible to understand how the trial court is to examine those pleadings further to decide whether or not a "reasonable
doubt" exists as to the applicability of the defense.
2. Nondefendant Directors
a. Sources of Bias
Even directors who are not named as defendants may be unable
to provide a truly disinterested determination of the corporation's interest in pursuing litigation against their colleagues. Because of what
has been termed structural bias, 48 directors who have no immediate
stake in the prospective litigation may still place the interest of the
individual defendants ahead of the company's in deciding whether to
sue, dismiss, or settle. This bias stems from three significant sources.
A major source of bias lies in the relationship between corporate
management and the board of directors. Studies undertaken in the
1960's and 1970's indicated that management, and especially the corporation's chief executive officer, often have substantial, if not controlling, influence over the board. 49 This control begins with the
selection and retention of directors. The chief executive typically
45. See, e.g., Heit v. Baird, 567 F.2d 1157 (1st Cir. 1977); Barr v. Wackman, 36 N.Y.2d 371,
329 N.E.2d 180, 368 N.Y.S.2d 497 (1975).
46. 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984).
47. Eg., Schlensky v. Wrigley, 95 Ill. App. 2d 173, 237 N.E.2d 776 (1968).
48. Note, The Business Judgment Rule in Derivative Suits Against Directors, 65 CORNELL L.
REV. 600 (1980); Coffee & Schwartz, supra note 14, at 283. See also Dent, The Power of Directorsto
Terminate ShareholderLitigation: The Death ofthe Derivative Suit?, 75 N.W. U.L. REV. 96, 111-17
(1980).
49. M. MACE, DIRECTORS: MYTH & REALITY (1971); Mace, Directors: Myth & Reality-Ten
Years Later, 32 RUTGERS L. REV. 293 (1979); M. EISENBERG, supra note 43, at 139-48.
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selects the board members. 50 Naturally, individuals are chosen whose
support can be counted on. 51 In addition, the power to select often
gives the power to remove. On a number of occasions, chief execu52
tives have "fired" directors who opposed them.
The influence of management and particularly the chief executive
over the board is furthered by economic and psychological ties. Di53
rectorships involve a certain amount of remuneration and prestige.
Directors who are also executives of the corporation are dependent on
superior officers for promotion and retention in their full-time positions. 54 Many outside directors are attorneys, investment bankers,
55
and others who may have goods or services to sell to the company.
As a result, board members may be reluctant to challenge those in
management who have the power to establish or sever these economic
relationships. In addition, directors are often friends and associates of
the chief executive. 56 Whether or not a prior relationship exists,
group dynamics operate to discourage any challenge by individual
members of the board. 57
This influence seriously undermines the ability of nondefendant
50. C. BROWN, PUTTING THE CORPORATE BOARD TO WORK 23 (1976); J. BACON & J.
BROWN, CORPORATE DIRECTORSHIP PRACTICES: ROLE, SELECTION AND LEGAL STATUS OF THE
BOARD 6, 10, 12 (Conference Bd. Rep. No. 646 1975). See also KORN/FERRY INTERNATIONAL,
BOARD OF DIRECTORS; SIXTH ANNUAL STUDY 22 (Feb. 1979).

The rise in the use of nominating committees may ultimately serve to decrease the chief executive's power over the selection process. Attainment of this goal, however, appears to be some time
off, if achievable at all. See Brudney, The Independent Director-HeavenlyCity or Potemkin Village,
95 HARV. L. REV. 597, 610 n.39 (1982); Solomon, Restructuring the CorporateBoard of Directors:
Fond Hope-FaintPromise?, 76 MICH. L. REV. 581, 605-06 (1978).
51. M. EISENBERG, supra note 43, at 146; M. MACE, supra note 49, at 99; Mutual Funds as
Investors of Large Pools of Money, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 669, 739 (1967).
52. M. MACE, supra note 49, at 79-81. In one noted survey, 37% of the corporations responding reported "firing" directors. HEIDRICK & STUGGLES, INC., PROFILE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS 11 (1971).

53. Average annual compensation for directors in large companies was almost $12,000 in 1981.
Brudney, supra note 50, at 613 n.47.

54. Solomon, supra note 50, at 584; M. EISENBERG, supra note 43, at 145. While the board is
ordinarily charged with selection of major officers, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 312(b) (West 1982);
N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 715(a) (McKinney 1963); ABA MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 50 (1979 rev.),

the actual practice is generally for the board to rubberstamp the chief executive's selections. M.
EISENBERG, supra note 43, at 162-63 n.88.

55. Professor Eisenberg suggests that over one-third of outside directors fit into these categories. M. EISENBERG, supra note 43, at 146. See also KORN/FERRY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 50,
at 12.

56. Solomon, supra note 50, at 584-85.
57. Note, The Propriety of Judicial Deference to Corporate Boards of Directors, 96 HARV. L.
REV. 1894 (1983); Reed, On The Dynamics of Group Decisionmakingin High Places, DIRECTOR &
BOARDS, 40, 51-53 (1978). One indicia of management dominance over the board is the number of
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directors to determine the corporation's interest in much, if not most,

derivative litigation. The reason is simple. Typically, the alleged
wrongdoing will involve management as opposed to outside directors.5 8 There is no reason to believe, however, that outside directors
will be more favorably disposed toward litigation against management
59
than they are to challenge management's actions generally.
Beyond the problem of management dominance, a second source
of bias is created by the dynamics of litigation (or proposed litigation)
against any of one's colleagues. Litigation in general tends to promote a "we versus they" attitude, and derivative suits are no exception.60 The nondefendant directors will naturally sympathize with
their fellow directors under attack. 61 This will be particularly true if
the defendants, as is often the case, face a serious, personal financial
threat from the litigation. 62 The nondefendant directors may also
consider that in some different or later situation they could be the
ones looking to their colleagues for support.63 In contrast, the direccases in which directors have approved self-dealing transactions later found to be unfair to the corporation involved. See Brudney, supra note 50, at 617-20.
58. This is undoubtedly a direct function of the lesser involvement of the outside directors with
the corporation.
59. Coffee & Schwartz, supra note 14, at 283; Dent, supra note 48, at 113; Klein, Conduct of
Directors When Litigation is Commenced Against Management, 31 Bus. LAW. 1355, 1359 (1976).
60. See Coffee & Schwartz, supra note 14, at 283; ALI Draft Principles, supra note 10, § 7.03
comment b.
61. "It would be naive to believe that a few directors, no matter how uninvolved in the transaction at issue, would have no sense of loyalty to the other members of the board." Stein v. Bailey, 531
F.2d 684, 693 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). See also Pomerantz v. Clark, 101 F.2d 341, 344 (D. Mass. 1951). In
addition to the feelings created by the shared experience of the boardroom, directors may often
possess a number of social ties with one another, including working for the same community organizations and belonging to the same exclusive clubs. Brudney, supra note 50, at 612-13; Solomon,
supra note 50, at 584-85.
62. See Lasker v. Burks, 567 F.2d 1208, 1212 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd on othergrounds, 441 U.S.
471 (1979): "It is asking too much of human nature to expect that the disinterested directors will
view with the necessary objectivity the actions of their colleagues in a situation where an adverse
decision would be likely to result in considerable expense and liability for the individuals
concerned."
63. Many outside directors are executives in other corporations. HEIDRICK & STRUGGLES,
INC., DIRECTOR DATA: CHARATERISTICS OF OUTSIDE DIRECTORS (June 1978). Such directors
could easily possess a "there but for the grace of God go I" empathy for the defendants. See Zapata
Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 787 (Del. 1981). Indeed, in Rosengarten v. IT&T, 466 F. Supp.
817 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), one of the directors on the special litigation committee was a defendant in
another derivative suit brought on behalf of a different corporation. Both suits involved similar
claims of wrongful conduct (specifically, questionable foreign payments). See also Maldonado v.
Flynn, 597 F.2d 789 (2d Cir. 1979) (claim that a director was not disinterested in approving a
change in a stock option plan because of his probable concern over the board's reaction to his insider
trading).
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tors will be suspicious or hostile toward the plaintiff shareholder. To
them, that individual represents an outsider who is trying to interfere
in the board's dominion. When, as is typical, the plaintiff is a small
shareholder with little personal stake in the corporation, the directors
will undoubtedly conclude that the real force behind the suit is the
desire of the plaintiff's attorney for legal fees. 64 Under these circumstances, it is difficult to see how an unprejudiced determination of the
corporation's interest is going to be reached.
Finally, the phenomenon of appointing a committee of directors

(usually called a special litigation committee) to determine the corporation's interest has served only to create a new source of bias while
attempting to mask the old. The problem is that the committee members are typically appointed by the same directors who are defendants
in the lawsuit. 65 This puts the defendants in a position in which they

can select individuals whom they expect to be sympathetic. The result, of course, is significant bias. In essence, through this procedure,
the defendants are attempting to select their own judge and jury.
This, as any trial lawyer should attest, would give the defendants a

favorable result in all but the most clear-cut cases against them.
Worse, in this situation, the review is not limited to the merits of the

claim, but also encompasses intangible factors affecting the company's
interest. 66 As a result, preexisting sympathies become all the more

decisive. The results reached by these committees prove the existence
of this selection bias. Out of almost thirty reported cases involving
special litigation committees, in none did the committee recommend
prosecution of an action against directors. 67 Moreover, in a number
64. The antipathy with which the corporate community has viewed derivative plaintiffs and
their counsel may be nearly as old as the derivative suit itself. See Berlack, Stockholders' Suits: A
Possible Substitute, 35 MIcH. L. REV. 597, 605-06 (1937); Dykstra, The Revival of the Derivative
Suit, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 74, 75 (1967). For a modem expression of a corporate general counsel's
attitude, see Duesenberg, The Business Judgment Rule and ShareholderDerivative Suits: A View
From the Inside, 60 WASH. U.L.Q. 311 (1982). As the Duesenberg article illustrates, the problem of
bias involves not only the prejudices of directors, but also those of the counsel who are likely to
advise them. Such counsel will often enter with a prodefendant orientation, both to encourage their
possible future employment and by virture of their prior experience and inclination as part of the
corporate-defense bar. See Dent, supra note 48, at 117-18; Cox, Searching for the Corporation'sVoice
in Derivative Suit Litigation: A Critique of Zapata and the ALI Project, 1982 DUKE L.J. 959, 962
n. 12. See also Bishop, Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New Trends In Indemnification of Corporate
Directors and Officers, 77 YALE L.J. 1078, 1080 (1968).
65. Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S.Ct. 1498 (1983). Indeed,
this is an inescapable consequence of all or a majority of the original directors being named as
defendants. See Lewis v. Anderson, 615 F.2d 778 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 869 (1980).
66. See infra text accompanying notes 101-05.
67. See Cox, supra note 64, at 963. The one -blemish" on the record of special litigation
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•of these cases, the courts68 seriously questioned or rejected the committees' recommendations.
b.

The Impracticalityof Searchingfor Independence
One response to bias is to argue that the courts can determine

which directors are independent and which are not.69 Such a determination, however, is rendered impractical by the inherent dilemma in
which it will place the courts. Unless they simply ignore structural
bias, extensive adjudication will be required to determine (if that is
even possible) whether the directors can exercise independent judgment. Such extensive adjudication, however, would frustrate the
whole purpose of allowing the board to terminate litigation which is
against the corporation's interest.
The issues involved in determining bias may be as difficult as the
issues raised by the underlying claims and could easily require the
development and presentation of extensive evidence. Take, for example, bias caused by possible dominance of management over outside
directors. As discussed above, a number of studies found such domicommittees found by Professor Cox occurred in Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 103 S. Ct. 1498 (1983), in which the committee recommended that the corporation attempt
to settle rather than simply dismiss the action against several corporate officers. Even then, the
committee did not recommend the action be continued if those defendants were unwilling to settle.
Since Professor Cox's survey of cases, at least five more have been reported involving recommendations by special litigation committees: Hasan v. Clevetrust Realty Investors, 729 F.2d 372 (6th Cir.
1984); In re General Tire & Rubber Co. See. Litig., 726 F.2d 1075 (6th Cir. 1984); Mills v. Esmark,
Inc., 573 F. Supp. 169 (N.D. Ill. 1983); In re Continental Ill. Sec. Litig., 572 F. Supp. 928 (N.D. Ill.
1983); Mills v. Esmark, Inc., 544 F. Supp. 1275 (N.D. Ill. 1982); Stein v. Bailey, 531 F. Supp. 684
(S.D.N.Y. 1982). In none did the committee recommend prosecution of the action against any directors (although the Continental Illinois committee recommended continuing the action against three
former lending officers who had been forced to resign).
68. Hasan v. Clevetrust Realty Investors, 729 F.2d 372 (6th Cir. 1984) (held the committee's
investigation was incomplete and its one member was biased); Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880 (2d Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1498 (1983) (rejected the committee's recommendation based on the
court's strongly differing assessment of the strength of the plaintiffs claims); Watts v. Des Moines
Register & Tribune, 525 F. Supp. 1311 (S.D. Iowa 198 1) (in denying a motion for summary judgment in order to allow discovery into the reasons for the committee's recommendation, the court
expressed concern that the recommendation was partially contrary to the advice received from the
committee's outside counsel); Mahar v. Zapata Corp., 490 F. Supp. 348 (S.D. Tex. 1980) (held the
committee's balancing of costs and gains from continuing the suit was unreasonable); Grynberg v.
Farmer, 1980 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97, 683 (D. Colo. Nov. 19, 1980) (held the committee's
investigation was one-sided and incomplete, and the committee members were not independent). See
also Swenson v. Thibunt, 39 N.C. App. 77, 250 S.E.2d 279 (1978), appeal dismissed, 296 N.C. 740,
254 S.E.2d 181 (1979) (committee held to be subject to the influence of the defendants).
69. Eg., Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 899-900 (2d Cir. 1982), (Cardamone, J., dissenting), cert.
denied, 103 S. Ct. 1498 (1983); Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S.2d
920 (1979).
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nance to be typical in the corporations surveyed. Proof that outside

directors will be unable to exercise independent judgment in a specific
case, however, will require more than reference to general studies.
Evidence concerning the manner in which the outside directors came
to be on the board-including who suggested their nomination and
what expectations management may have had as to their independence-would be relevant, as would any evidence that management
possessed the power to force the removal of those directors. 70 Also
relevant would be evidence concerning any economic relationships the
outside directors have, or hope to have, with the corporation, as well

as social or other relationships between the outside directors and the
management defendants. 71 In addition, the voting pattern of the
72
board in response to management proposals could be examined.
This, in turn, could easily lead into a morass of side issues concerning
the merits of a wide variety of past board actions.

Similarly, determining the existence and extent of bias caused by
the dynamics of suing any fellow directors could require evidence on a
number of questions. The nondefendant directors' backgrounds and
their other activities-especially concerning their management of different companies-would be relevant to assessing how much preexisting sympathy they may possess for the defendants. 73 In addition, the
directors' attitudes towards the shareholders, in general, and deriva70. See deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 286 F. Supp. 809, 814 (D. Colo. 1968), modified on
other grounds, 435 F.2d 1223 (10th Cir. 1970).
71. See Hasan v. Clevetrust Realty Investors, 729 F.2d 372, 378-79 (6th Cir. 1984); ALI Draft
Principles, supra note 10, § 7.03e. Cf. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 17,517 (1981)
(proposed amendment regarding relationships of outside directors to management which proxy
statement must disclose). But see In re General Tire & Rubber Co. Sec. Litig., 726 F.2d 1075 (6th
Cir. 1984) (director held to be independent despite being a partner in a law firm which had been
retained by the corporation); Maldonado v. Flynn, 597 F.2d 789, 794-95 (2d Cir. 1979) (rejected the
argument that a director who was a member of a law firm that did work for the corporation could
not be considered disinterested in approving amendment to stock option plan).
72. Mills v. Esmark, Inc., 544 F. Supp. 1275, 1285 n.9 (N.D. Ill. 1982); deHaas v. Empire
Petroleum Co., 286 F. Supp. 809, 814 (D. Colo. 1968), modified on other grounds, 435 F.2d 1223
(10th Cir. 1970); Ripley v. International Rys. of Cent. Am., 8 App. Div. 2d 310, 188 N.Y.S.2d 62, 71
(1959), off'd, 8 N.Y.2d 430, 209 N.Y.S.2d 289, 171 N.E.2d 443 (1960).
73. See supra text accompanying notes 61-63. In Rosengarten v. IT&T, 466 F. Supp. 817, 825
(S.D.N.Y. 1979), the court rejected the claims that one member of a special litigation committee was
biased because he was a defendant in a similar suit and that another was biased because he was a
director in a second corporation which also engaged in questionable foreign payments. The court
stated that the plaintiff presented no evidence that either director participated in or knew of the
payments by the other companies. Query what the court's reaction would have been, however, if the
plaintiff had sought to discover and present such evidence. The potential to vastly broaden the issues
in a lawsuit is obvious.

1985]

DERIVATIVE SUITS

*tive suits, in particular, would be relevant in determining their ability
to exercise unprejudiced judgment. If a special litigation committee
were formed, evidence as to what criteria were used to select its members would be material. 74 Moreover, the plaintiff might seek to prove
bias by attacking the reasons given for the directors' litigation
decision.

75

Evidence on these questions could include the testimony of the
directors, of others in corporate management, and of those who know
the directors. Further testimony might be supplied from experts on
corporate management and psychology. To obtain such evidence
would require substantial discovery. 76 Once the evidence is mar-

shaled, its presentation to the court may require a not so "minitrial."' 77 The inevitable result will be to generate substantial litigation
74. Cf Abella v. Universal Leaf Tobacco Co., 546 F. Supp. 795, 799 (E.D. Va. 1982) (noting
"the danger of allowing the board of directors to appoint a few 'good ol' boys' as a special litigation
committee" in order to conduct a whitewash).
75. Mills v. Esmark, Inc., 544 F. Supp. 1275, 1283 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
76. See Gall v. Exxon Corp., 418 F. Supp. 508, 519-20 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Lasker v. Burks, 404
F. Supp. 1172, 1180 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Bernstein v. Mediobanca Banca di Credito FinanziarioSocieta per Azioni, 69 F.R.D. 592, 597 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). See also Genzer v. Cunningham, 498 F.
Supp 682 (E.D. Mich 1980) (noting that extensive discovery was taken, including "necessarily" discovery on the merits); Rosengarten v. IT&T, 466 F. Supp. 817, 825 n.20 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (noting
that the plaintiff took lengthy depositions of the litigation committee members). In Lasker, it took
over a year after the court denied the motion to dismiss to allow the plaintiff discovery on the
committee members' independence before the court granted the renewed motion. See Lasker v.
Burks, 426 F. Supp. 844 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), rev'd, 567 F.2d 1208 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 441 U.S. 471
(1979).
77. See Lewis v. Anderson, 615 F.2d 778 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 869 (1980)
(remanded for mini-trial on whether litigation committee acted independently and in good faith);
Grynberg v. Farmer, 1980 FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 97,683, at 98,583 (D. Colo. Oct. 8, 1980)
(two-day evidentiary hearing held on litigation committee members' independence). See also Nussbacher v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 444 F. Supp. 973 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (stated in dictum that issues of
credibility involved in deciding whether board's refusal to sue was in good faith required trial on the
merits); Gall v. Exxon Corp., 418 F. Supp. 508, 520 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) ("issues of intent, motivation
and good faith are particularly inappropriate for summary disposition"). Cf.Vernars v. Young, 539
F.2d 966, 968 (3d Cir. 1976) (control by defendant of nondefendant director is an "intensely factual"
issue).
The mini-trial never took place in Lewis, 509 F. Supp. at 235, nor do there appear to be many
reported cases in which a court held a trial confined to determining the independence of the directors
who recommended dismissal of a derivative suit. There are several reasons for this. Most courts
have been unwilling to consider structural bias and thus dismiss claims on demurrer or motion for
summary judgment when nondefendant directors without a tangible interest vote against the suit.
See infra text accompanying notes 78-86. On the other hand, courts which allow the plaintiff to get
past the pleading stage based on allegations of influence or control normally skip ahead to trial of the
underlying claim (unless the action settles) rather than make the plaintiff prove at a separate trial the
allegations that give standing. See Comment, supra note 20, at 199. Finally, the burden of an added
trial before reaching the merits may deter the plaintiff from proceeding or prompt the defendants
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costs. This would completely undermine the major reason for considering the board's decision and present possibilities for abuse by both
sides. Finally, no matter how much evidence is produced, in the end,
the extent and effect of bias in a given case will normally remain
imponderable.
The alternatives to this extensive adjudication are either to preclude the directors' say when the claim is against any of their col-

leagues or simply to ignore structural bias and limit the meaning of
independence to the lack of any blatant self-interest. The courts have

generally taken the latter approach, even though the result is to make
a mockery of any assurances that the corporate interest would be protected by the scrutiny of independent directors.

Court decisions dealing with excuses for not making a demand
on the board and with the effect of the board's refusal to sue have
imposed pleading requirements on the plaintiff which often serve to
foreclose any inquiry into structural bias. For example, while some
courts have been liberal in excusing a demand or in ignoring its refusal when an allegation has been made that the defendants control
the directors, 78 the majority has required a particularized pleading of
the facts that show such control. 79 These courts then often ignore

specific allegations which might suggest such influence or control unless the allegations regard the holding of a controlling block of
stock. 80 The result of such decisions is to place the plaintiff in a diinto settling. In Lewis, the plaintiff's attorney conceded the independence and good faith of the
litigation committee. 509 F. Supp. at 235. One wonders whether this concession would have occurred, however, had the plaintiff's attorney not still been able to successfully move for an award of
fees.
78. Dopp v. American Elec. Laboratories, Inc., 55 F.R.D. 151, 153-54 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Burt
v. Irvine Co., 237 Cal. App. 2d 828, 47 Cal. Rptr. 392 (1965); McKee v. Rogers, 18 Del. Ch. 81, 156
A. 191, 193 (1931).
79. E.g., Weiss v. Temporary Fund, Inc., 692 F.2d 928, 942-43 (3d Cir. 1982); Grossman v.
Johnson, 674 F.2d 115 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 85 (1982); Greenspun v. Del E. Webb
Corp., 634 F.2d 1204, 1208-10 (9th Cir. 1980); In re Kauffman Mut. Fund Actions, 479 F.2d 257
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 857 (1973); Stepak v. Dean, 434 A.2d 388 (Del. Ch. 1981).
80. See Vernars v. Young, 539 F.2d 966 (3d Cir. 1976) (in a suit by a 27% shareholder and
director against a 50% shareholder, director, and principal officer of the corporation for misappropriating corporate funds, the allegation that the defendant controlled the corporation's third director
was held inadequate); Weiss v. Temporary Inv. Fund, Inc., 516 F. Supp. 665 (D. Del. 1981), affd,
692 F.2d 928 (3d Cir. 1982), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 104 S. Ct. 989 (1984) (court
held the allegation that the defendant investment advisor selected the fund's directors who were
therefore beholden for their prestigious positions was inadequate pleading of control); Stepak v.
Dean, 434 A.2d 388, 391 n.2 (Del. Ch. 1981) (court held the allegation of control inadequate despite
evidence that the directors were playing a game of "musical chairs" in which the defendants constituted a majority of the board at all times except the few months immediately surrounding the filing

1985]

DERIVATIVE SUITS

lemma when dealing with bias. If the plaintiff simply pleads that the
defendants control the other directors, the majority of courts will hold
this allegation inadequate for lack of specificity. If the plaintiff, however, pleads a few indicia of possible bias, he or she risks them being
trivialized by the court. On the other hand, if the plaintiff pleads
every conceivable fact which might suggest bias, he or she risks illustrating to the court precisely why it would not want to get involved in
this issue. Moreover, it is rarely possible for the plaintiff to possess
the detailed facts to show bias at the pleading stage when he or she
has not yet taken any discovery. 81
Similarly, courts that defer to the recommendations of special
litigation committees also generally ignore structural bias in their
evaluation of the committee members' independence; witness their repeated willingness to grant summary judgment despite evidence
which would appear to create at least an issue of fact as to possible
bias. 82 The results in these cases stand in marked contrast to the norof the lawsuit). Cf In re Penn Central Sec. Litig., 367 F. Supp. 1158, 1163-66 (E.D. Pa. 1973)
(control adequately pleaded when supported by defendants' ownership of an overwhelming majority
of the corporation's stock). In Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984), the Delaware Supreme
Court went even further by holding that an allegation that the defendant owned a controlling block
of stock would not excuse demand unless accompanied by other allegations which show the directors
are actually beholden to the defendant. The court then rejected allegations that the directors were
personally selected by the defendant and had approved a wasteful contract beneficial to the defendant as meeting this requirement. This approach is completely blind to reality. One does not need to
see the private salute in order to know the sergeant has control.
Some courts, however, have been willing to recognize more subtle evidence of dominance by
management defendants. In deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 286 F. Supp. 809 (D. Colo. 1968),
modified on other grounds, 435 F.2d 1223 (10th Cir. 1970), the court excused demand based on
allegations of control by two management defendants over three outside directors. The court noted
that the defendants had selected the outsiders for the board, the outsiders had displayed only limited
interest in the corporation and were dependent on the defendants for information, and the outsiders
had in the past acquiesced in the defendants' wishes on a corporate action even though feeling it ill
advised. Further, the defendants had the power, with 43% of the stock, to remove the outsiders. In
Papilsky v. Berndt, 59 F.R.D. 95, 97 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), appeal dismissed,503 F.2d 554 (2d Cir. 1974),
the court excused demand on the directors of an investment fund based, inter alia, on the allegations
that because of the "strategic positions" occupied by affiliated director defendants, they controlled
the unaffiliated directors. See also Boyko v. Reserve Fund, Inc., 68 F.R.D. 692 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)
(court held that, because of the unique structure of the investment fund industry in which the investment advisor typically controls the fund but actual bias of the unaffiliated directors is hard to prove,
it will excuse demand when one affiliated director is on the board).
81. Bernstein v. Mediobanca Banca di Credito Finanziario-Societa per Azioni, 69 F.R.D. 592,
597 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). See also Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374, 379 (2d Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 976 (1975) (recognizing that the minority shareholder's limited knowledge of the corporation's internal structure prevents a detailed pleading of fraud).
82. Mills v. Esmark, Inc., 544 F. Supp. 1275, 1284-85 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (The court held on
motion for summary judgment that the litigation committee was independent as to state law claims
despite both its members being named as defendants on those claims, as well as on misleading proxy
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mal recognition by the courts that issues of intent and motivation are
particularly inappropriate for summary disposition. 83 They can only
be explained by an implicit adoption of a standard for independence
that focuses on the lack of a committee member's pecuniary interest
in the transaction challenged by the suit.
Commentators suggesting criteria for determining director independence have not fared much better than the courts in dealing with
structural bias. Various objective standards have been proposed, including: whether the defendants constitute a majority or a minority
of the board,8 4 whether the "disinterested" directors were nominated
by an independent nominating committee and elected before or after
the lawsuit was filed, 85 and whether they are free of certain defined,
significant relationships with management defendants.8 6 These standards, however, do not isolate all, or perhaps even most, cases of
claims (which the court conceded was "evidence of domination by those who profited from the
section 14 violation"). The court also rejected arguments that bias was shown by the committee
members' consistent participation in unanimous board votes as well as the manner in which their
report was prepared.); Watts v. Des Moines Register & Tribune, 525 F. Supp. 1311, 1327-28 (S.D.
Iowa 1981) (court held no material issue of fact existed as to independence of litigation committee
members despite their having been appointed to the board and the committee by the defendants,
their having some personal and social relationships with the defendants, and the court having serious
questions about the conclusions of their report, especially insofar as the committee rejected the recommendation of their outside counsel to pursue part of the action); Genzer v. Cunningham, 498 F.
Supp. 682, 693-97 (E.D. Mich. 1980) (court held no material issue of fact existed as to committee
members being disinterested, despite their appointment to the board and the committee by the defendants, their reliance upon a report prepared with the participation of the defendant accounting
firm, and one of the committee members doing consulting work for the corporation); Rosengarten v.
IT&T, 466 F. Supp. 817 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (court held on motion for summary judgment that the
litigation committee was unbiased despite one member being a defendant in a similar derivative suit
involving another corporation); Lasker v. Burks, 426 F. Supp. 844 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), rev'd, 567 F.2d
1208 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 441 U.S. 471 (1979) (court held no material issue of fact existed as to
independence of litigation committee members despite their appointment to the board of directors
and to the boards of several other investment funds by the defendant investment advisor, their personal and business relationships with the defendants, and the involvement of an officer of the defendant investment advisor in obtaining special counsel for the litigation committee). But see Hasan v.
Clevetrust Realty Investors, 729 F.2d 372 (6th Cir. 1984) (held sole litigation committee member
was biased because of business ties between him and chief executive officer).
83. E.g., Poller v. CBS, 368 U.S. 464, 473 (1962); Gall v. Exxon Corp., 418 F. Supp. 508, 520
(S.D.N.Y. 1976).
84. Dent, supra note 48, at 110; Coffee & Schwartz, supra note 14, at 323.
85. ALI Draft Principles, supra note 10, § 7.03e.
86. Id. In a similar vein, § 7.03c(iii) of the ALI Draft Principles precludes the dismissal of a
self-dealing claim against a person or persons having control over the corporation (as defined in
§ 1.04) based on the recommendation of a committee of directors. Since a dismissal of such claims
can be made upon the recommendation of a court-appointed litigation committee (§ 7.03 comment
e), it is clear that § 7.03c(iii) must be predicated upon a concern over director independence. For a
criticism of § 7.03c(iii), see Cox, supra note 64, at 999-1007.

1985]

DERIVATIVE SUITS

structural bias 87 -a fact their proponents seem to recognize when
they also advocate that the courts exercise judgment as to the corporation's interest.88 If one is relying on the court to determine the corporation's interest, it is unclear why one should waste the time even
considering whether the directors are independent.
B.

The PlaintiffShareholder

When the board of directors suffers from a conflict of interest,
the derivative suit allows individual shareholders to make litigation
decisions on behalf of the corporation. Unfortunately, plaintiff shareholders are also frequently subject to a conflict between their interest
and the company's. This fact has bedeviled the derivative suit
throughout its history and explains in large part the courts' continued
insistence upon preserving a role for the directors even when, as discussed above, it was not well advised.
In expressing concern about leaving decisions to plaintiff shareholders, courts and commentators typically refer to the potential for
strike suits.8 9 This is misleading. Generally, a strike suit is thought of
as a meritless suit brought solely to obtain a settlement based on its
nuisance value. 90 No doubt this phenomenon may exist in derivative
actions. However, there is no reason to believe it is either confined to
or more prevalent in derivative as opposed to other litigation. 91
87. The problems with attempting to create objective standards for director independence are
well illustrated by a Minnesota statute which defines disinterested directors for purposes of terminating a derivative suit. The director must not be "the owner of more than one percent of the outstanding shares of, or a present or former officer, employee, or agent of the corporaton or of a related
corporation and [have] not been made or threatened to be made a party to the proceeding in question." MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.243 (Vest 1983). This statute may be both overinclusive (as it
would exclude a director who had been a minor employee years before) and underinclusive (as it
might not exclude a director who was the spouse of the main defendant). Moreover, it ignores many
of the sources of bias discussed above.
88. ALI Draft Principles, supra note 10, § 7.03c(ii); Coffee & Schwartz, supra note 14, at 32425; Dent, supra note 48, at 129-34.
89. E.g., Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 548 (1949); Zapata Corp. v.
Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 786-87 (Del. 1981); Claman v. Robertson, 164 Ohio St. 61, 128 N.E.2d
429, 433-34 (1955); Note, Extortionate CorporateLitigation: The Strike Suit, 34 COLUM. L. REV.
1308 (1934).
90. E.g., ALI Draft Principles, supra note 10, at 226. See also Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor
Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 740 (1975); F. WOOD, N.Y. STATE CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, SURVEY
& REPORT REGARDING STOCKHOLDERS' DERIVATIVE SUITS 112-15 (1944).
91. See ALI Draft Principles, supra note 10, at 227-28; Hornstein, The Death Knell of Stockholders'Derivative Suits in New York, 32 CALIF. L. REV. 123, 127-28 (1944). Indeed, in Blue Chip
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975), the Supreme Court expressed concern about
strike suits in a nonderivative context.
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Sometimes, the term strike suit is broadened to encompass litigation
which has merit but is brought to extort a private settlement rather
than recovery for the company. 92 This is a phenomenon unique to
derivative litigation. However, it is only one symptom of a larger
problem.
The problem with leaving plaintiff shareholders in charge of the
litigation is that they are only affected by corporate recovery or by
costs of litigation imposed on the corporation insofar as this changes
the value of their shares. This change is likely to be miniscule. 93 As a
result, the real force making the litigation decisions will be the plaintiff's attorney who hopes to be awarded fees out of any recovery or
settlement. 94 One exception to this occurs when the plaintiff owns a
substantial percentage of the corporation's stock. Even in that case,
the plaintiff may still be motivated less by the corporation's interest in
recovery than by other factors which may have little to do with the
company's welfare (e.g., his or her desire to wrest some control from
the defendants). 95 In the typical case in which the attorney is the

driving force behind the suit, the danger exists that, under some cir92. See, e.g., Dent, supra note 48, at 137.
93. Coffee & Schwartz, supra note 14, at 304. For example, in Rosenfeld v. Fairchild Engine &
Airplane Corp., 309 N.Y. 168, 128 N.E.2d 291 (1955), the plaintiff (an attorney) sought to recover
$261,522 for a corporation in which he owned 25 out of its over 2,300,000 shares. Indeed, even the
multimillion dollar recovery in Winkelman v. General Motors Corp., 44 F Supp. 960 (S.D.N.Y.
1942), raised the value of the plaintiffs' 80 shares by only eight cents per share. W. CARY & M.
EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS CASES & MATERIALS 888 (5th ed. 1980).

94. Coffee & Schwartz, supra note 14, at 316 ("plaintiffs counsel is the engine that drives the
derivative action"). For an illustration of what is probably a typical relationship between a derivative plaintiff and his or her attorney, see Mills v. Esmark, Inc., 573 F. Supp. 169, 176 (N.D. IIl. 1983)
(plaintiff had little knowledge of what was going on in the suit that had been prompted by her greatuncle, an attorney).
95. See, e.g., Dillon v. Berg, 482 F.2d 1237 (3d Cir. 1973) (derivative suit for proxy rule violation arising out of a struggle for control of the corporation); Grynberg v. Farmer 1980 FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 97,683 (D. Colo. Oct. 8, 1980) (A derivative suit was brought under Section 16(b) of
the 1934 Securities Exchange Act to recover profit for short swing trading: plaintiff and his family
were the beneficial owners of 72% of the corporation's stock that was held in a voting trust. The
purpose of the suit was to prevent the board from diluting the family's control upon the termination
of the trust through stock options issued to the executives then running the company.); S. Solomont
& Sons Trust v. New England Theatres Operating Corp., 326 Mass. 99, 93 N.E.2d 241, 244 (1950)
(derivative suit initiated after the principal plaintiff, a substantial shareholder, failed to get elected to
the board); Zidell v. Zidell Inc., 277 Or. 423, 560 P.2d 1091, 1095 (1977) (A derivative suit was
brought by one of the two remaining shareholders in a corporation against the other for "usurp[ing]
a corporate opportunity" by personally buying out a third party's shares rather than having the
corporation make the purchase. The result of the purchase was to upset an equal holding of shares
between the plaintiff and the defendant to give.).
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cumstances, the attorney's interest will diverge from the
corporation's.
1.

The Decision to Initiate a Lawsuit

The first gap between the interests of the plaintiff's attorney and
of the corporation lies in the way each calculates the value of the suit.
From the corporation's standpoint, a variety of costs may render even
a potentially meritorious claim not worth bringing. To begin with, if
successful, the plaintiff's attorney will be awarded fees and expenses
from the corporation, thereby reducing the company's total recovery. 96 Even if there is no monetary recovery for the corporation, the
plaintiff's attorney may still be awarded fees resulting in a net out-ofpocket cost to the company. 97 The corporation also risks incurring
substantial liabilities to the defendants should the plaintiff not prevail.
State corporation codes normally require the company to reimburse
its directors for litigation expenses if the directors are successful in
their defense on the merits against an action brought on the company's behalf.98 Even if not mandated by law, the corporation may
choose or be contractually obligated to indemnify the defendants to
the extent allowed. 99 In a settlement, this often means that the corporation will pay the attorneys' fees for both sides.100
96. Eg., Shlensky v. Dorsey, 574 F.2d 131, 145 (3d Cir. 1978) (award of over $600,000 for
plaintiffs' attorneys upon achieving a settlement of $3,500,000 for the corporation); Ripley v. International Rys. of Cent. Am., 16 A.D.2d 260, 227 N.Y.S.2d 64, aftd, 12 N.Y.2d 814, 236 N.Y.S.2d
64, 187 N.E.2d 131 (1962) (over $2 million awarded to plaintiff's attorneys after obtaining a recovery
for the corporation of $8 million). For a collection of amounts awarded in 39 cases, see Cole, Counsel Fees in Stockholders' Derivativeand ClassActions-Hornstein Revisited, 6 U. RICH. L. REv. 259,
283-85 (1972).
97. E.g., Lewis v. Anderson, 509 F. Supp. 232 (C.D. Cal. 1981) (plaintiff's attorney awarded
$110,000 even though the action was dismissed on the motion of a special litigation committee);
Fletcher v. AJ. Indus., 266 Cal. App. 2d 313, 72 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1968) (over $66,000 awarded);
Bosch v. Meeker Coop. Light & Power Ass'n, 257 Minn. 362, 101 N.W.2d 423, 426 (1960) (court
may award fees if the action achieves a "substantial benefit" for the corporation).
98. Eg., CAL. CORP. CODE § 317(d) (West 1977 & Supp. 1985); DEL. GEN CORP. LAW
§ 145(c) (1983); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 724 (McKinney 1963).
99. Statutes allowing indemnification of corporate directors vary widely from state to state.
Generally, indemnification will be allowed so long as the directors were not adjudged liable and they
are found by some nominally disinterested party (e.g., the other directors, independent counsel, or
the shareholders) to have acted in good faith. See generally H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note
3, § 380.
100. Eg., Shlensky v. Dorsey, 574 F.2d 131 (3d Cir. 1978); Lewis v. Newman, 59 F.R.D. 525
(S.D.N.Y. 1973). In addition, the corporation will normally obtain and pay for its own counsel, if
for no other reason than to file an answer. Moreover, while the burden of indemnification may be
mitigated through the purchase of insurance, the suit may then have an adverse effect on future
premiums. See Abella v. Universal Leaf Tobacco Co., 495 F. Supp. 713, (E.D. Va. 1980); J. BISHOP,
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There are also various intangible costs imposed by derivative litigation. Major litigation involving a corporation will often cause a
substantial diversion of the time and energy of its personnel. 101 In the
case of a derivative suit against members of corporate management,
this diversion will include top-level decisionmakers. Further, a lawsuit is rarely likely to improve relations with the defendants. Therefore, if the management has been successful overall, it may be in the
corporation's interest to overlook an arguable transgression here or
there rather than risk losing the services of key personnel or undermining their morale. 10 2 The attitude of other corporate employees
may also be a factor to consider. The corporation may benefit from
deterring future wrongdoing. On the other hand, the company may
suffer if the action engenders hostility by being perceived as unfairly
harsh. 103 Moreover, if the corporation pursues every arguable duty of
care claim, outside directors may become difficult to find and all directors may become overly cautious in taking necessary business
risks. I° 4 Finally, adverse publicity from the suit may be a serious
concern.' 0 5
The plaintiff's attorney will see these costs in a very different
light. Instead of constituting a diminution of any recovery, for the
attorney, the fees are the recovery. Of course, the attorney takes the
risk that, if the suit is unsuccessful, his or her time will have been
spent without repayment. 0 6 This expenditure of time, however, is
THE LAW OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS INDEMNIFICATION INSURANCE

8.01[l]

(1981).
101. See, e.g., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 740-41 (1975); Findley
v. Garrett, 109 Cal. App. 2d 166, 240 P.2d 421 (1952); Duesenberg, supra note 64, at 332-33 ("it is
an easy matter for opposing lawyers, through depositions, interrogatories and subpoenas of documents literally to tie in knots a target organization").
102. E.g., Abbey v. Control Data Corp., 460 F. Supp. 1242 (D. Minn. 1978), arid 603 F.2d
724 (8th Cir. 1979); S. Solomont & Sons Trust v. New England Theatres Operating Corp., 326 Mass.
99, 93 N.E.2d 241 (1950). See also Solomon, supra note 50, at 599-600 (the board of Northrop
retained chief executive despite involvement in wrongdoing because he was "simply too valuable to
let go").
103. See, e.g., Gaines v. Haughton, 645 F.2d 761, 767 n.ll (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S.
Ct. 1006 (1982); Gall v. Exxon Corp., 418 F. Supp. 508, 514 n.13 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
104. See, e.g., Conard, A BehavioralAnalysis of Directors'Liabilityfor Negligence, 1972 DUKE
L.J. 895, 903-905.
105. See, e.g., Gaines v. Haughton, 645 F.2d 761, 767 n.ll (9th Cir. 1981); Berger v. Dyson,
111 F. Supp. 533, 536 (D.R.I. 1953). See also Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 248 N.E.2d
910, 912, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78, 82 (1969) (A corporation "has a great interest in maintaining a reputation of integrity . . . for its management.").
106. See Kim, The Demand on Directors Requirement and the Business Judgment Rule in the
Shareholder Derivative Suit: An Alternative Framework, 6 J. CORP. L. 511, 521 n.56 (1981). This
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only important relative to other available opportunities. Depending
on what demands there are for his or her services, a lawyer might be
willing to take on a number of low probability cases in the hope that a
few will lead to a substantial recovery. 107 In fact, fee awards to plaintiff's counsel recognize and reward this sort of thinking.108 Moreover,
the other costs imposed on the corporation by derivative litigation
normally do not affect the plaintiff's attorney at all. If the defendants
prevail, the plaintiff's attorney will generally not be liable to indemnify them for their expenses. 1 9 Nor need he or she be concerned
about distraction of corporate personnel, future relations between the
corporation and the defendants, attitudes the suit engenders among
other employees or prospective employees, or how the suit may affect
the public's perception of the company." 0
A number of states have statutes that require the plaintiff, at the
start of a derivative lawsuit, to post security out of which the corporation can be reimbursed for its expenses."' These statutes could force
the plaintiff's attorney to consider the costs imposed on the corporation. However, security for expenses statutes do not exist in most
states, nor do they cover derivative actions brought in federal courts
for violation of federal law. 12 Even when they do exist, their use can
be avoided by a number of tactics. One popular method is for the
plaintiff to demand to see the corporation's shareholder list in order to
enlist other participants in the suit. Since these statutes commonly
exempt derivative suits brought by a holder or holders of a minimum
percentage of shares, the courts typically require the company to accede to this request. 113 The prospect of a forced disclosure of the
risk is somewhat mitigated, however, by the possibility that an award may be based on nonpecuniary
recovery. See supra text accompanying note 97.
107. See Coffee, Rescuing the Private Attorney General: Why the Model of the Lawyer As
Bounty HunterIs Not Working, 42 MD. L. Rav. 215, 231 (1983). Consistent with this observation, a
high proportion of derivative actions ultimately decided on the merits fail. See Jones, supra note 2,

at 546-47.
108. See, eg., Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp.,
487 F.2d 161, 168 (3d Cir. 1973) (one factor in fee award is a recognition of the risk taken when the
fee is contingent on success); Newmark v. RKO Gen., Inc., 332 F. Supp. 161, 164 (S.D.N.Y. 1971)
(same); Leubsdorf, The Contingency Factor in Attorney Fee Awards, 90 YALE L.J. 473 (1981).
109. See ALI Draft Principles, supra note 10, § 7.03, at 294.
110. In the typical case, these costs will also not significantly affect the plaintiff shareholder as
he or she does not own a substantial percentage of the corporation's stock.
11. Eg., CAL. CORP. CODE § 800(C)-(f) (West 1982 & Supp. 1984); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW
§ 627 (McKinney 1963 & Supp. 1983-84).
112. ALI Draft Principles, supra note 10, § 7.01 comment f.
113. See, eg., Baker v. Macfadden Publications, Inc., 300 N.Y. 325, 90 N.E.2d 876, 878-89
(1950); Auerbach v. Shafstar, 34 Misc. 2d 658, 229 N.Y.S.2d 927, 931 (1962).
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shareholder list, however, is often so distasteful to management that
those in charge of the corporation are many times deterred from re4
questing the posting of security.' 1
Even when security for expenses statutes exist and are used, they
do not transfer all the corporation's costs to the plaintiff. For example, they apparently do not cover intangible costs-distraction of personnel, damaged relations with the defendants, and harm to employee
morale and public goodwill' 5-which in many cases might be more
significant than the immediate dollar costs of the suit. Thus, the calculations of the plaintiff's attorney will remain different from those of
the corporation. Most significantly, when these statutes exist and are
used, the result is typically overkill. Because of the upfront costs
which posting security imposes, the requirement is as likely to deter
suits that are in the corporation's interest as it is to deter those that
are not.116 As a result, most commentators call for the repeal of these
statutes rather than their expansion.'" 7
Nor can pretrial proceedings designed to screen out nonmeritorious claims, that is, the demurrer and motion for summary judgment,
protect the corporation from derivative suits that are not in its interest. Demurrers merely test the sufficiency of the plaintiff's pleadings,
and a summary judgment will only be granted against those claims
with so little merit that they do not present a material issue of fact.
Numerous suits have sufficient merit to get past these stages and yet
fail at trial. Moreover, these pretrial proceedings do not consider the
various costs that may render it against the corporation's interest to
proceed even with a meritorious claim.
2.

The Decision to Accept or Reject a Settlement
The divergence between the corporate interest and that of the

plaintiff's attorney is a little more complicated when it comes to settlement. The basic problem is the same: The corporation and the plain114. Note, Security for Expenses in Shareholders' Derivative Suits: 23 Years' Experience, 4
COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 50, 64-65 (1968).
115. These statutes refer to "reasonable expenses, including attorneys' fees" which suggests a
limitation to out-of-pocket expenditures. See generally Note, Security for Expenses LegislationSummary, Analysis, and Critique, 52 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 276-77 (1952).
116. See, e.g., Hornstein, supra note 91, at 124-25.
117. E.g., id; ALl Draft Principles, supra note 10, § 7.02d; Proposed Revisions of the Model
Business CorporationAct Affecting Actions by Shareholders, 37 Bus. LAw. 261, 265-66 (1981). Indeed, it is ironic to see some commentators who are favorably inclined toward derivative actions
point to such statutes as a better way to prevent strike suits than the present deference given to
special litigation committees. Kim, supra note 106, at 527-28.
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tiff's counsel do not measure the costs and gains from derivative
litigation in the same manner. However, the specific manifestations of
that difference are more varied when it comes to settlement than in
deciding whether to sue.
In one particular setting, the difference in the way the parties
evaluate a settlement is virtually identical to the difference in the way
they decide whether to sue. This is when the settlement, which may
be nominal, would be advantageous to the company primarily because
it will terminate the litigation and avoid further expense.1 18 For the
reasons noted above, the plaintiff's attorney may be inclined to reject
such a settlement because he or she does not incur the same expenses
as the corporation. Different methods for calculating costs is not the
only factor, however, which might lead the plaintiff's attorney to oppose a settlement favorable to the corporation. There is also the difference in what constitutes recovery. For the plaintiff's attorney,
recovery is the fees he or she will be awarded. The problem is that an
early settlement may not produce as large a fee as would the same
settlement entered into at a later point in the litigation. The existence
of this divergence will depend on the method used by the court to
determine the appropriate fee award.
There are two principal methods used by the courts to calculate
attorney's fees in derivative suits. Recently, formulas geared to the
amount of work performed (often called the lodestar approach) have
become the vogue.1 19 Since, under this approach, the more hours expended the higher the fee, an incentive is created to avoid an early
settlement. 120 As might be expected, this incentive has not been without effect. Defense counsel report a noticeable reluctance of plaintiffs'
attorneys to consider settlement in the early stages of litigation in
12 1
courts where the lodestar formula is used.
118. Eg., Lewis v. Newman, 59 F.R.D. 525, 529 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
119. E.g., Shlensky v. Dorsey, 574 F.2d 131, 139 (3d Cir. 1978); City of Detroit v. Grinnell
Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 473-74 (2d Cir. 1974); Lindy Bros. Builders Inc. v. American Radiator &
Standard Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d 161, 167-69 (3d Cir. 1973); FEDERAL JUDICIAL MANUAL FOR
COMPLEX LITIGATION § 1.47 (5th ed. 1982).
120. ALI Draft Principles, supra note 10, § 7.07 comment b.
121. Herzel & Hagan, Plaintiffs' Attorneys' Fees in Derivativeand Class Actions, LITIGATION,
Winter 1981, at 25, 26. A related problem occurs where an early settlement agreement is reached

but the parties delay presenting it to the court in order for the plaintiffs attorney to expend the hours
needed to obtain the desired fee. Coffee, supra note 107, at 247.

Section 7.07d of the ALI Draft Principles attempts to deal with the problem of plaintiffs' attorneys rejecting settlement offers in order to increase their fees by empowering the court to disallow a
claim for any time spent by the attorney after receipt of an offer unless he or she achieves a better
ultimate recovery than the settlement offered. ALI Draft Principles, supra note 10, § 7.07d. This or
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The other commonly used method (often referred to as the salvage value approach) is to set attorney's fees as a percentage of recovery.122 This has the opposite effect of the lodestar formula. Under the
salvage value approach, the incentive is for the plaintiffs attorney to
settle early, thereby maximizing the fee in relationship to the work
performed. 123 The problem is that such early settlement might be
against the corporation's interest in cases in which continued prosecution could achieve a substantially greater recovery. This illustrates
that in dealing with the decision to settle, not only is there a problem
of the plaintiff's attorney rejecting offers which may be in the company's interest to accept, but there is also the equally troubling problem of the attorney accepting a settlement that may be in the
corporation's interest to reject.
For both the plaintiff's attorney and the corporation the key motivation to settle usually lies in the immediate value of the proposal:
The "bird in the hand." 124 However, the plaintiff's attorney may be
willing to give up more "birds in the bush" to achieve a settlement
than might be in the corporation's best interest. There are a number
of reasons for this. As noted above, under a salvage value approach,
the increased work which occurs when a settlement offer is rejected
may not produce a proportionate increase in the attorney's fee. In
addition, as the size of the corporate recovery grows, the percentage
of the award granted as fees decreases.1 25 The result is to create a
widening gap between the value that a larger recovery will have to the
company and its worth to the attorney. At the other end of the scale,
the attorney will often have a greater need for a quick and certain
recovery than will the corporation, which presumably is not waiting
126
on the suit to pay its bills.
similar provisions, however, inevitably founder between the Charbydis of having so many qualifiers
as to be ineffectual and the Scylla of creating undue pressure upon plaintiffs' counsel to accept a
possibly inadequate settlement.
122. See, e.g., Murphy v. North Am. Light & Power Co., 33 F. Supp. 567, 570-71 (S.D.N.Y.
1940); Sugarland Indus. Inc. v. Thomas, 420 A.2d 142, 149-51 (Del. 1980); ALI Draft Principles,

supra note 10, § 7.07 comment b.
123. Clermont & Currivan, Improving on the ContingentFee, 63 CORNELL L. REv. 529, 54346 (1978). See also Saylor v. Lindsley, 456 F.2d 896, 900 (2d Cir. 1972).
124. Alleghany Corp. v. Kirby, 333 F.2d 327, 347 (2d Cir. 1964) (Friendly, J.,dissenting),
affid en banc by an equally divided court, 340 F.2d 311 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. dismissed, 384 U.S. 28
(1966).
125. Id. See also Cole, supra note 96, at 283-85.
126. See Coffee, supra note 107, at 230-31. See also Saylor v. Lindsley, 456 F.2d 896, 900-01
(2d Cir. 1972). In technical parlance, the attorney is likely to have a greater aversion to risk and
delay than someone looking at the suit solely from the standpoint of the corporation.
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There is also the ever present temptation to trade away corporate
recovery for increased recovery by the plaintiff or his or her attorney.
At its extreme, this creates the problem of private settlements alluded
to earlier. In a private settlement, the plaintiff or his or her attorney is
paid by the defendants to drop the suit. 2 7 Often this payment will be
made from the corporate treasury thereby compounding the harm to
the company. 128 Even without reaching the extreme of a private settlement, corporate recovery may be partially sacrificed to the plaintiff
counsel's greater concern for his or her fees. The problem arises because attorney's fees are often negotiated as part of the settlement.
Specifically, the settlement might include the defendants' agreement
to pay the fees directly, or more commonly, the defendants may be
asked to agree that they will not oppose the fee request when it is
presented to the court.' 2 9 Since the essence of negotiation is the exchange of quidpro quos, such fee discussions place the plaintiff's attorney in an evident conflict of interest when simultaneously negotiating
corporate recovery. 30 Moreover, the availability of fee awards based
on nonpecuniary corporate benefit exacerbates this problem. Most
courts now allow the plaintiff to collect attorney's fees from the corporation-even though no monetary recovery was achieved-when
the lawsuit produced reforms or other action deemed to be a substantial benefit to the company.' 3 ' Such reforms or actions, however, may
provide a way to justify compensation for the plaintiff's attorney with
a minimum amount of hardship for the defendants. This allows the
parties to follow a path of least resistance potentially precluding a
recovery for the corporation that tougher bargaining could have
127. Haudek, The Settlement and Dismissalof Stockholders'Actions-PartII: The Settlement,
23 Sw. L.J. 765, 816 (1969).
128. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 545 (1949). For some examples of
private settlements that were discovered after the fact, see Certain Teed Prods. Corp. v. Topping,
171 F.2d 241 (2d Cir. 1948); Clark v. Greenberg, 296 N.Y. 146, 71 N.E.2d 443 (1947); Manufacturers Mut. Fire Ins. Co. of R.I. v. Hopson, 176 Misc. 220, 25 N.Y.S.2d 502 (Sup. Ct. 1940), afl'd, 288
N.Y. 668, 43 N.E.2d 71 (1942).
129. Haudek, supra note 127, at 783-84. Some courts have condemned agreements of the former nature as attempting to preclude court supervision of the award. See In re General Motors
Corp. Engine Interchange Litig., 594 F.2d 1106, 1130-31 (7th Cir. 1979). See also FEDERAL JUDICIAL MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 1.46 (5th ed. 1982). But see Glicken v. Bradford, 35
F.R.D. 144, 158 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (allowing such an agreement because its effect is to increase corporate recovery).
130. ALI Draft Principles, supra note 10, § 7.07 comment c; Haudek, supra note 127, at 784.
See also White v. New Hampshire Dept. of Employment Sec., 455 U.S. 445, 453-54 n.15 (1982);
Mendoza v. United States, 623 F.2d 1338, 1352-53 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,450 U.S. 912 (1981).
131. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.

UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:265

obtained. 132
There is no simple way to remove these conflicts of interest. Precluding the practice of simultaneously negotiating attorney's fees and
the settlement does not appear to be a practical solution.1 33 For one
thing, it potentially makes settlement more difficult. Corporations
will not know the full impact of the settlement without knowing what
attorney's fees will be requested. Without the assurance that their fee
request will not be opposed, plaintiffs' counsel may be tempted to delay settlement in order to work more hours and justify a higher fee.' 34
Further, it is unlikely that such a prohibition can be enforced.1 35 Nor
would it seem reasonable to preclude attorney's fees based on nonpecuniary benefit. In some cases, such benefits may be as real as a monetary recovery and fully justify the award of fees for the attorneys who
36
procured them. 1
C. The Courts
It has been recognized for some time that none of the parties to
an agreement settling a derivative action may be counted on without
qualification to protect the corporation.137 The response is to require
that settlement agreements be approved by the court. 138 The theory is
that the corporation will be protected if the court, after providing notice and a hearing to all concerned, uses its independent judgment to
39
determine if the settlement is in the company's best interest.
Most courts and commentators also appear to recognize the conflicts of interest to which directors and plaintiff shareholders are subject in determining whether it is in a corporation's best interest to
pursue a derivative suit.14° Until recently, the response of the courts
132. ALl Draft Principles, supra note 10, § 7.04 comment c.
133. This is the approach adopted by the ALI Draft Principles § 7.07. Id. § 7.07.
134. Statement of the Business Roundtable on the American Law Institute's Proposed "Principles of Corporate Governance & Structure: Restatement & Recommendations" 61-62 (Feb. 1983)
[hereinafter cited as Business Roundtable].
135. See Haudek, supra note 127, at 784. But see Coffee, supra note 107, at 273-74.
136. Bosch v. Meeker Coop. Light & Power Ass'n, 257 Minn. 362, 101 N.W.2d 423, 425-26
(1960); ALI Draft Principles, supra note 10, § 7.07.
137. E.g., McLaughlin, Capacity of Plaintiff-Stockholderto Terminate a Stockholder's Suit, 46
YALE L.J. 421, 435 (1937).
138. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
139. For a discussion of the procedures and standards employed in court review of settlement
agreements, see Haudek, supra note 127, at 785-807.
140. E.g., Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 632, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1001, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920,
928 (1979) ("The possible risk of hesitancy on the part of the members of any committee, even if
composed of outside, independent, disinterested directors, to investigate the activities of fellow mem-
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was simply to accept this as an unpleasant fact of life while deferring
to the decision of one side or the other.14 ' Then came Zapata Corp. v.
Maldonado, in which the Delaware Supreme Court decided to borrow
from the pattern followed for settlements and announced that, when

dealing with the recommendation of a special litigation committee,
the courts may use their independent judgment on whether a derivative suit serves the corporate interest.142 Other courts have followed

Delaware's lead,' 43 and the ALI's Draft Principles have expanded it
by requiring the exercise of judicial judgment in all cases when the
board, or a committee thereof, recommends against suing a corporate
fiduciary. 44
Unfortunately, neither when it comes to initiation nor settlement
does the exercise of the courts' judgment provide a satisfactory solution to determining the corporation's interest. The problem is not, as
some courts and commentators suggest, 45 that judges lack the expertise to make these decisions. Individual judges are probably as capable as anyone to weigh the various costs against the gains incurred in
bers of the board where personal liability is at stake is an inherent, inescapable, given aspect of the
Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 890 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103
corporation's predicament .. ");
S. Ct. 1498 (1983) ("The incentives underlying derivative litigation are such that actions may well be
brought which cannot be dismissed on motion but which also are unlikely to lead to net benefit to
the corporation.").
141. Compare Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979)
and In re Kauffman Mut. Fund Actions, 479 F.2d 257 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 857 (1973)
with Maher v. Zapata Corp., 490 F. Supp. 348 (S.D. Tex. 1980) and Papilski v. Berndt, 59 F.R.D. 95
(S.D.N.Y. 1973).
142. Zapata v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981). The Zapata opinion contains two important limitations on cases in which the courts may exercise their independent judgment. First, the
procedure is limited to cases in which demand on the board is excused. 430 A.2d at 784. If demand
is required and the board refuses to sue, the court will not apply its judgment. Second, exercise of
the court's judgment is not mandated but rather is discretionary. Id. at 789. This seems curious,
however, in view of the court's terming the procedure "the essential key in striking the balance" it
was endeavoring to achieve. Id.
143. Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S.Ct. 1498 (1983) (Connecticut law); Abella v. Universal Leaf Tobacco Co., 546 F. Supp. 795 (E.D. Va. 1982) (Virginia law);
Watts v. Des Moines Register & Tribune, 525 F. Supp. 1311 (S.D. Iowa 1981) (Iowa law). But see
Miller v. Register & Tribune Syndicate, Inc., 336 N.W.2d 709 (Iowa 1983).
144. ALI Draft Principles, supra note 10, § 7.03c. Section 7.03c removes the two limitations
found in the Zapata opinion. Exercise of the courts' judgment is no longer discretionary and, in
addition, is required in demand-refused cases so long as the claim is against a corporate fiduciary.
On the other hand, § 7.03e of the ALI Draft Principles may narrow the range for exercising the
courts' judgment by making it more difficult to establish the requisite independence of the directors
recommending dismissal. Id. § 7.03e.
145. E.g., Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979); Joy
v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 898 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S.Ct. 1498 (1983) (Cardamone, J.
dissenting).
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litigation and settlement. 146 Instead, the problem lies in the adversarial process by which judicial decisions are reached. The result of
this process, if the decision is hotly contested, will be to create extensive litigation over the wisdom of decisions that have as their purpose
the termination of litigation. Alternatively, if the decision is not contested (either because no party before the court wishes to or because
the court curtails the ability for challenge), the result will often be
inadequate protection of the corporation. 47
1.

The Decision to Pursue the Suit

The question whether it is in a company's interest to pursue a
derivative lawsuit raises a number of difficult factual and legal issues
which the court will need to address in exercising its judgment. First,
there must be an assessment of the probability of the plaintiff's success
in the action, which, of course, means considering the various factual
48
and legal questions involved in deciding the merits of the claim.'
Further, the size of the recovery in the event of success must be estimated. This requires review of the defendant's ability to pay in addition to the amount of damages likely to be awarded. 149 The probable
recovery must be weighed against the various costs to the corporation.
That involves more than simply estimating the total costs of attorney's fees and other out-of-pocket expenses which the company might
ultimately pay. 150 In addition, difficult factual and legal issues may be
146. Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1498 (1983). Indeed,
many settlement conferences demonstrate that judges often have a more realistic understanding of
the burdens involved in litigation than do numerous businessmen.
147. Since the problem lies in employing the adversary process, use of special masters, see
Note, Shareholder Derivative Suits-Watts v. Des Moines Register & Tribune-DerivativeSuits in
Iowa: Filling a Hollow Guarantee with Adequate Safeguards, 8 J. CORP. LAW 145, 163 (1982) or
arbitrators, see Comment, The Zapata Two-Step-Will Corporations March Out of Delaware:
Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 55 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 759, 770-71 (1981), who may bring a greater
expertise but would still rely on an adversary proceeding, would not be a solution.
148. Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1498 (1983); Abella v.
Universal Leaf Tobacco Co., Inc., 546 F. Supp. 795 (E.D. Va. 1982); ALI Draft Principles, supra
note 10, § 7.03 comment d. While the court in Joy states that it is only necessary to weigh the
uncertainties involved in these questions rather than resolve them, 692 F.2d at 892, even that balancing should require careful exploration.
149. Byers v. Baxter, 69 App. Div. 2d 343, 419 N.Y.S.2d 497 (1979). See also Joy v. North,
692 F.2d 880, 892 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1498 (1983) (noting that the existence of
insurance is relevant to the calculation of potential benefits).
150. Undoubtedly, these estimates themselves could become the subject of dispute. See Note,
Judicially Exercised Business Judgments In Shareholder Derivative Suit Dismissals: Implementing
Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado,46 ALBANY L. REV. 980, 1007 n.122 (1982) (briefs filed by the parties
in Zapata disputed probable expenditures on attorneys' fees). See also Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880,
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raised in determining the extent of the corporation's obligation to in52
demnify the defendants, 15 1 the coverage provided by any insurance,1
or the propriety of large expenditures by the company in defense of
the action.15 3 Further issues may be raised regarding the existence
and extent of various intangible costs of litigation to the company.
For example, if it is claimed that distraction of corporate personnel is
one of the costs justifying dismissal, there may be a question not only
as to the exact amount of the time lost by employees, but also as to
the impact such lost time will actually have. 154 Similar questions can
be raised concerning claimed effects of the suit on employee morale' 55
56
and the corporation's public reputation.
As noted earlier, one intangible cost that might be considered is
57
the possibility of soured future relations with the defendants.
While this consideration might be decisive in a given case, it has the
potential of greatly expanding the scope of the controversy since it
would allow the plaintiff legitimately to raise questions relating to the
quality of the managers' entire performance. Not only might their
past successes or failures be explored, but consideration also could be
given to the availability of other equally capable individuals who
898 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1498 (1983) (Cardamone, J., dissenting) (questions how a
court is to determine the "inherently speculative costs of future attorneys' fees and expenses related
to litigation"). Such a dispute could have the interesting side-effect of placing the parties in a rather
awkward position when it comes to estimating the plaintiff's fee award. For purposes of the motion
to dismiss, the plaintiff may argue that the likely award will be small, while the corporation's counsel
takes the contrary position. Needless to say, the parties will take precisely the opposite stance when
the plaintiff actually files for an award.
151. See, eg., Tomash v. Midwest Dev. Corp., 281 Minn. 21, 160 N.W.2d 273 (1968) (dispute
over corporate indemnity obligations under by-law and statute).
152. See, e.g., Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 895 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1498
(1983) (insurer raised a question as to its liability); Continental Copper & Steel Indus. v. Johnson,
641 F.2d 59 (2d Cir. 1981) (insurer denied that policy covered litigation expenses of directors serving
on other boards at the request of the company); Shlensky v. Dorsey, 574 F.2d 131, 148 n. 11 (3d Cir.
1978) (insurer threatened to rescind policy for purported nondisclosure). In Joy, however, the court
stated that the existence of insurance should not be considered in the calculation of the corporation's
costs "since premiums have previously been paid." 692 F.2d at 892. This appears to be something
of a nonsequitur.
153. See, eg., Otis & Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R., 57 F. Supp. 680 (E.D. Pa. 1944), affld, 155
F.2d 522 (3d Cir. 1946) (motion to strike defenses asserted by corporation regarding merits of derivative claim).
154. See ALI Draft Principles, supranote 10, § 7.03, at 348-49; Dent, supranote 48, at 129-30.
155. See Dent, supra note 48, at 129-30.
156. See Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 893 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1498 (1983)
(demanding that claims of lost profits as a result of the suit's effect on goodwill be shown by verifiable examples in similar firms).
157. See supra text accompanying note 102.
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could replace the defendants should the suit cause that to be necessary.' 5-8 Further, when assessing future relations with the defendants,
the possibility of a repetition of the wrongdoing should be considered.
This, however, may require more careful scrutiny of the merits of the
suit since the nature of the defendants' past conduct says much about
the likelihood of their committing wrongful acts in the future. In addition, it means assessing the adequacy of steps, if any, taken to prevent such a repetition.1 59 This, in turn, can raise further questions
160
about the manner in which the corporation is managed.
A final consideration was raised by the Delaware Supreme Court
in Zapata. There it was stated that public policy considerations
should be taken into account in applying the court's judgment on
whether to dismiss.16 1 What this entails is not entirely clear, but presumably the Zapata court meant that even though the costs of the suit
outweigh its probable gains to the company, the action may be allowed to continue if the suit serves some overriding public purpose in
deterring corporate wrongdoing. 162 This is a highly questionable notion. If conduct by a corporate fiduciary offends the law (as, for instance, in cases involving corporate bribery and other "questionable"
payments), there are public prosecutors to pursue the action. While
the law may allow or even encourage private suits for added deterrence, 63 it has never compelled private individuals to bring actions
which they deem to be against their interest. For example, proprietors or partners who suffer a loss by the wrongful conduct of their
agent are not compelled to sue the agent no matter how offensive the
conduct is to public policy; nor would anyone else be allowed to sue
the agent using the partnership's name and pocketbook. Barring a
specific legislative command, there seems to be no reason to have a
different result when the agent is a corporate fiduciary. Nevertheless,
since judges are in a public role, consideration of policy may be inevi158. Of course, the acquisition of new managers will itself entail disruption and cost. Lasker v.
Burks, 404 F. Supp. 1172, 1176 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
159. See, e.g., Stein v. Bailey, 531 F. Supp. 684 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (in recommending against
pursuing the suit, the litigation committee relied in part on the adoption of safeguards which purportedly reduced the chances of a repetition); Abramowitz v. Posner, 513 F. Supp. 120 (S.D.N.Y.
1981), affid, 672 F.2d 1025 (2d Cir. 1982) (same); Maher v. Zapata Corp., 490 F.2d 348 (S.D. Tex.
1980) (same).
160. See generally Solomon, supra note 50 (discussing the effectiveness of various reform
measures).
161. Zapata, 430 A.2d at 789.
162. See generally ALI Draft Principles, supra note 10, § 7.03 comment f.
163. E.g., J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
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raise
table if resort is had to their judgment. Naturally, the result is to
164
further factual and legal issues which may require resolution.
While the Zapata decision did not resolve a number of questions
as to how a court is to obtain and weigh the data needed to evaluate
these issues, it suggested that the normal adversary process will be

followed.165 The result will be to create extensive and costly litigation
over whether the burden of the suit outweighs its benefit. Initially,
each of the factual issues listed above could mandate substantial discovery.1 66 For example, it may be extremely difficult for a court to
assess the likelihood of success until significant discovery is taken on
the merits-a point that courts have repeatedly recognized in reviewing settlement agreements.' 67 Discovery, however, will presumably
not be limited to the merits of the plaintiff's claim. If, for instance,
the defendants' ability to respond to a judgment becomes an issue in
determining the extent of probable recovery, then an inquiry into
their worth-something not normally allowed prior to obtaining a
judgment 168-would appear to be called for. Far more onerous possibilities for discovery exist with respect to the various intangible costs
outlined earlier. For example, determining the extent of time lost by
corporate personnel because of the suit could call for polling corpo164. For example, the court might consider the significance of derivative actions in deterring
the misconduct in question, the availability of alternate actions, the steps already taken by the corporation or public authorities, and the nature of the policies involved. ALI Draft Principles, supranote
10, § 7.03 comment f.
165. The court stated that the motion to dismiss should be handled in a manner "akin to
proceedings on summary judgment." Zapata, 430 A.2d at 788. However, the court further cautioned that the moving party must show there is no material issue of fact and left open the possibility
of a trial on any factual issues raised. Id. at 788 n.15. Given the numerous areas for dispute outlined
above, it would be a rare case when, under any reasonable application of the standard, no material
issue of fact could be found.
166. Both the Zapata decision and the ALI Draft Principles allow the trial court to grant
"limited discovery" into the basis for the committee's dismissal recommendation. Id. at 788; ALI
Draft Principles, supra note 10, § 7.03c. It is not clear how such discovery can be significantly
limited while still allowing the plaintiff a fair opportunity to challenge the committee's recommendations. For example, in Watts v. Des Moines Register & Tribune, 525 F. Supp. 1311 (S.D. Iowa
1981), the court limited discovery both in terms of time (30 days) and scope (inquiry allowed as to
what factors the committee considered but not why it considered them). This hardly seems designed
to provide the plaintiff with an adequate opportunity to challenge the report.
167. E.g., Girsh v. Jepsen, 521 F.2d 153 (3d Cir. 1975) (disapproving settlement when objectors not afforded adequate discovery); Detroit v. Grinnel Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 462-63 (2d Cir. 1975)
(completion of adequate discovery to assess agreement intelligently is a factor in approval of settlement). See also FEDERAL MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 1.46 (5th ed. 1982) (same).
168. E.g., Doak v. Superior Court, 257 Cal. App. 2d 825, 65 Cal. Rptr. 193 (1968).
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rate employees. 169 Depositions might then be taken to determine the

veracity of the poll. Of course, the end result would be further loss of
time and diversion of corporate employees from their jobs. Similarly,
surveys could be taken to determine the effect of the suit on employee
morale and the corporation's public image. Perhaps the techniques

used in trademark cases 170 could be employed in making these
surveys. Of course, such surveys themselves might not advance the
corporate image. This will, moreover, presumably require the employment and deposition of experts. 171
Once discovery is completed, the presentation of evidence to the

court will require something more than a "mini" trial. This is well
illustrated by examining the amount of evidence heard by special litigation committees in their attempts to determine whether to pursue a
derivative suit. These committees often report hearing extensive testimony over the course of investigations which may span several
months.' 72 Indeed, courts which defer to the recommendations of
173
If
these committees typically require such detailed investigations.
the court is to exercise its independent judgment on the corporate
interest, it should hear for itself the testimony presented to the com-

mittee. Moreover, it should allow the plaintiff an opportunity to
cross-examine the company's witnesses and to present his or her own

evidence. 74 The result will be for the court to take longer than the
committee to hear evidence on the issue.
The length of hearings conducted to determine whether the court
should approve the settlement of a derivative action can also provide a
169. See ALI Draft Principles, supra note 10, § 7.03, at 348-49 (recommending court request
detailed corroboration of loss of executive time or attention).
170. E.g., Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Rogers Imports, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 670 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
171. Cf Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1498 (1983) (litigation committee obtained opinions from two experts on the effect of the suit on the reputation of the
corporation).
172. E.g., Gaines v. Haughton, 645 F.2d 761 (9th Cir. 1981) (investigation took ten months);
Abella v. Universal Leaf Tobacco Co., 546 F. Supp. 795 (E.D. Va. 1982) (counsel for committee
prepared for its review 160 investigative reports); Gall v. Exxon Corp., 418 F. Supp. 508 (S.D.N.Y.
1976) (during four-month investigation, committee interviewed over 100 witnesses).
173. E.g., Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979). See
also Hasan v. Clevetrust Realty Investors, 729 F.2d 372 (6th Cir. 1984) (court found committee's
investigation to be incomplete); Grynberg v. Farmer, 1980 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,683 (D.
Colo. Oct. 4, 1980) (same).
174. See Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 788 (Del. 1981). Cf Joy v. North, 692
F.2d 880, 892 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1498 (1983) (In evaluating a motion to dismiss,
"[t]he weight to be given certain evidence is to be determined by conventional analysis, such as
whether testimony is under oath and subject to cross-examination.").
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useful comparison. Some of these hearings have been as long as major
trials.175 A hearing on whether it is in the corporation's interest to
dismiss normally will take even longer. For one thing, there is usually
little opposition to settlement. 176 In the case of a dismissal hearing,
however, there should be vigorous opposition by the plaintiff. Moreover, the standard of review for a settlement is different from what
presumably will be the standard for a decision to dismiss. The courts
will approve a settlement so long as it falls within a fairly broad range
which would be considered fair to the company. 177 Part of the reason
for this relaxed standard is an attempt to avoid turning settlement
hearings into full-scale trials. 178 However, such a relaxed standard
in which, unlike a settlement,
would be inappropriate for a dismissal
179
the corporation will get nothing.

175. Pergament v. Frazer, 93 F. Supp. 13 (E.D. Mich. 1950), aff'd sub nom., Masterson v.
Pergament, 203 F.2d 315 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 832 (1953) (hearing included seven weeks
of testimony, producing a 7000 page record); Zenn v. Anzalene, 17 Misc. 2d 897, 191 N.Y.S.2d 840
(1959), appeal dismissed, 11 App. Div. 2d 938, 210 N.Y.S.2d 748 (1960) (35 hearing days, 18 witnesses, 4600 pages of testimony, and 480 exhibits); Silverstein v. Clarkson, 194 Misc. 1046, 88
N.Y.S.2d 67 (1949) (over 800 pages of testimony heard).
176. See Haudek, supra note 127, at 805.
177. E.g., Goldshell v. Shapiro, 417 F. Supp. 1291 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Lewis v. Newman, 59
F.R.D. 525 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Schleiff v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 43 F.R.D. 175 (S.D.N.Y. 1967);
Glicken v. Bradford, 35 F.R.D. 144 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
178. Schleiffv. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 43 F.R.D. 175 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Glicken v. Bradford,
35 F.R.D. 144 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
179. Two examples are sometimes cited as instances when courts already are called upon to
determine whether a derivative suit is in the corporation's interest. In California, the court must
require the plaintiff to post security for the corporation's expense if it is shown "that there is no
reasonable possibility that the prosecution of the [claim] . . . will benefit the corporation or its
shareholders." CAL. CORP. CODE § 800(c) & (d) (West 1982). Section 232 of the CANADA BusiNESS CORPORATION Acr requires the prospective plaintiff to apply to the court for leave to bring a
derivative action. This will not be granted unless the court is satisfied that "it appears to be in the
interests of the corporation. . . that the action be brought." It turns out, however, that neither of
these two statutes is applied in a manner that gives much guidance concerning the burden imposed
on the parties by judicially balancing the costs versus gains of pursuing a potentially meritorious
action.
California courts implicitly interpret § 800(c) as only calling for a determination whether the
claims possess any merit, not for a judicial determination of the corporate interest in pursuing potentially meritorious claims. See, eg., Burt v. Irvine Co., 237 Cal. App. 2d 828, 47 Cal. Rptr. 392
(1965); Marble v. Latchford Glass Co., 205 Cal. App. 2d 171, 22 Cal. Rptr. 789 (1962); Barber v.
Lewis & Kaufman, Inc., 125 Cal. App. 2d 95, 269 P.2d 929 (1954). Moreover, the motion for
security must be made within 30 days after service of summons (CAL. CORP. CODE § 800(c) (West
1982)), and the plaintiff may be precluded from conducting any discovery prior to the hearing.
Melancon v. Superior Court, 42 Cal. 2d 698, 268 P.2d 1050 (1954); Barber v. Lewis & Kaufman,
Inc., 125 Cal. App. 2d 95, 269 P.2d 929 (1954). Under these circumstances, the potential for a
lengthy hearing is limited. Even so, several § 800(d) hearings have turned into small trials. See
Bailey v. Fosca Oil Co., 180 Cal. App. 289, 4 Cal. Rptr. 474 (1960) (six days of testimony); Thomas
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To require such extensive and costly litigation in order to determine whether further litigation is against the corporation's interest
hardly seems to be a sensible approach. The whole point of considering the motion to dismiss is to prevent the corporation from being
burdened by the costs of undesirable litigation, not to add to those
costs. To make things worse, the costs of this phase of the lawsuit will
be borne directly by the company. It is the company, not the defend-

ants, who will presumably make and defend a motion to dismiss on
the ground that the suit is against the corporate interest.1 80
Indeed, such extensive adjudication on this matter opens up possibilities for significant abuse by both sides at the expense of the corporation. Under the Zapata approach, the defendants, especially
those who may be unsure about the merits of their cause, have every
incentive to make the company form a special litigation committee
and move to dismiss. Even if the court, after using its judgment, ultimately rejects the motion, the defendants will have succeeded in imposing a significant burden on the plaintiff to resist the motion.
Further, since it is the corporation's attorneys who will handle the
motion, this will be accomplished at no cost to the defendants. On
the other hand, if the plaintiff is really attempting a strike suit, he or
she may not object too strenuously to this procedure. As noted above,
the process may significantly expand the scope of the relevant issues
for discovery and thus increase the potential nuisance value of the
suit.1 8 1 The ultimate irony is that the burdens of this procedure may
v. Summers Gyroscope Co., 160 Cal. App. 2d 234, 324 P.2d 893 (1958) (six days of testimony
producing an 810 page transcript).
While on its face Canada's statute might appear to call for a broad judicial inquiry into the
corporate interest, this is not how the statute has been interpreted. In Bellman v. Western Approaches, Ltd., 33 B.C.L.R. 45, 17 B.L.R. 117 (B.C.C.A. 1981), the British Columbia Supreme
Court held it was sufficient to meet the requirement of § 232 if an arguable case is shown to exist and
if the directors voting not to sue have a conflict of interest. This is little different from simply
applying the business judgment rule to a refusal by the directors to sue, and indeed the Canadian
court cited in support of its decision American cases which did just that.
180. E.g., Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1498 (1983);
Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981). See also Bishop, Derivative Suits Against
Bank Directors: New Problems New Strategies, 97 BANKING L.J. 158, 163 (1980) (noting that directors' and officers' liability insurance will not reimburse the corporation for this expense).
181. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 742-43 (1975) (value of an
unresolved lawsuit to a "strike" plaintiff lies in "the threat of extensive discovery and disruption of
normal business activities" before the suit can be proved groundless at trial).
Thus far, derivative plaintiffs apparently have not attempted to pursue possible discovery in
litigation committee cases to anywhere near the extent they might, even under the business judgment
rule approach. See, e.g., Abella v. Universal Leaf Tobacco Co., 546 F. Supp. 795 (E.D. Va. 1982)
(almost no discovery taken by plaintiff during the entire lawsuit); Abramowitz v. Posner, 513 F.
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serve to deter plaintiffs with legitimate claims from commencing the
suit or else pressure them into accepting an inadequate settlement. At
the same time, the procedure is useless against any strike suit since it
actually favors such a tactic by postponing resolution of the merits.
Finally, to create such extensive adjudication on matters extraneous to the merits is detrimental to the entire system of justice. It
marks a continuation of the trend of allowing major lawsuits to bog
down in protracted disputes over peripheral issues. To spend months
or years litigating over whether it is a good idea to litigate not only
results in a waste of judicial resources, it also inevitably fuels disrespect for the courts.
Undoubtedly, such extensive adjudication as outlined above is
not really what the Delaware Supreme Court or others who advocate
similar solutions have in mind. It is difficult to see, however, what
viable alternatives exist if the courts are to exercise their independent
judgment to determine the corporation's interest. Prior to Zapata,
several courts suggested a more limited exercise of judicial judgment. 182 Under this approach, they would no longer automatically
defer to the recommendation of directors on the sole condition that
those directors be nominally independent and act in good faith. Instead, the courts would reserve the right to reject a recommendation
of dismissal if they found it to be unreasonable. Admittedly, this standard would curtail possible litigation over the merits of the decision to
dismiss, although it might not eliminate it altogether depending on
how rigorously the court undertakes the reasonableness review. The
price for limiting review to reasonableness, however, is to undermine
almost completely the protection of the corporation from litigation
decisions made under the influence of structural bias.
There is a wide range of cases in which a decision whether or not
to sue would be reasonable regardless of which way one concluded.
Indeed, it is a rare case in which a claim is so one-sided that a lawyer
should advise his or her client that it would be unreasonable not to
bring suit. In this broad range, an exercise of judgment is called for.
Yet the danger of structural bias is that instead of objective judgment,
Supp. 120 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), affid, 672 F.2d 1025 (2d Cir. 1982) (no discovery requested regarding
litigation committee); Lewis v. Anderson, 509 F. Supp. 232 (C.D. Cal. 1981) (plaintiff gave up challenging the committee after apparently limited discovery). This suggests that the fear of strike suit
tactics by plaintiffs may be overblown.
182. E.g., Abbey v. Control Data Corp., 603 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
1017 (1980); Cramer v. General Tel. & Elec. Corp., 582 F.2d 259 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 1129 (1979).

UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:265

the directors' decision will be based on the interests of the defendants.
This danger will not be cured by a court review limited to reasonableness since decisions in this range will pass that test. The end result,
therefore, will be to deprive the corporation of any objective assessment of its interest in proceeding with claims against its directors except in the rare case in which the claims are overwhelming.
Since Zapata, there has not yet been adequate experience to establish how the exercise of the courts' judgment will work in practice. 183 Two courts thus far have attempted to use their own

judgment to determine the corporation's interest in pursuing a derivative suit. One, the Federal District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia, after deciding that Virginia would follow the Delaware ap183. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981), itself came to a rather ignominious end which did not require the courts to exercise much judgment on whether to dismiss but did
illustrate the limitations on the courts' judgment when it comes to approving a settlement. A lawsuit, Maher v. Zapata Corp., raising different but somewhat overlapping charges to those made by
Maldonado, had been filed in the Federal District Court for the Southern District of Texas. Before
the Delaware Supreme Court made its ruling in Zapata, this case settled. The settlement agreement
called for all charges against the defendants to be dismissed and provided that the corporation would
not oppose an award of $250,000 attorney's fees to the plaintiff. Incredibly, the settlement was
approved and the award made. Maher v. Zapata Corp., 714 F.2d 436 (5th Cir. 1983). (The purported benefit to the corporation achieved by the litigation was the resignation of the primary defendant shortly after the complaint was filed and a change in company policies.) This decision led to
the dismissal of Maldonado's case in the Southern District of New York on grounds of res judicata.
Maldonando v. Flynn, 573 F. Supp. 684 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). As an alternate ground for dismissal in
Maldonado, the district judge stated that he was exercising his independent judgment to agree with
the Zapata litigation committee. However, this appears to have been more an effort simply to terminate, once and for all, lengthy litigation rather than a reasoned judicial evaluation of the corporation's interest.
Several other cases arguably involving Zapata'stwo-step test should be noted. In two cases, the
only reported results involve step one-proof that the litigation committee was independent, acted in
good faith, and presented reasonable bases for its recommendations. In Watts v. Des Moines Register & Tribune, 525 F. Supp. 1311 (S.D. Iowa 1981), the court called for limited discovery on the
reasons for the committee's recommendation. In In re Continental Ill. Sec. Litig., 572 F. Supp. 928
(N.D. Ill. 1983), the court ordered an evidentiary hearing on step one during which the committee
would present its case for dismissal. After that, the court stated, it would decide about appropriate
discovery for the plaintiffs. In the end, however, after the initial hearing Continental Illinois withdrew the motion rather than participate in a mini-trial of the merits. In re Continental Ill. Sec.
Litig., 732 F.2d 1302 (7th Cir. 1984).
Finally, in Mills v. Esmark, Inc., 573 F. Supp. 169 (N.D. Ill. 1983), it is difficult to say just what
test the court was following. It did review (and reject) the specific challenges the plaintiff made to
the committee's report, but did not exercise its own judgment on the corporation's interest. At first
glance this appears strange, since the court purports to be following Zapata and notes that, in this
instance, it was dealing with a demand-excused situation. Since, however, the excuse was prior
board opposition to the suit rather than a conflict of interest by a majority of its members, perhaps
the court's more limited review was consistent with the purpose behind the Delaware Supreme
Court's distinction between demand-refused and demand-excused cases.
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proach, determined on a motion for summary judgment that further
pursuit of the derivative suit was not in the company's interest. 184
That decision, however, was made both easy and superfluous by the
court's simultaneous decision to grant the defendants' motion for
summary judgment on the merits.
A more difficult situation was presented to the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit in Joy v. North.1 85 Joy involved a derivative
suit against officers and directors of a bank which had made a series of
improvident loans. A special litigation committee, composed of two
directors elected to the board after most of the challenged transactions occurred, recommended that the claims against the outside directors be dismissed and that efforts be made to settle the suit against
the senior officers who had been directly involved in the loans. After
a review limited to the independence of the committee, the district
court granted summary judgment dismissing the case. 186 The court of
appeals reversed, holding that Connecticut courts would probably follow the Delaware approach and make their own judgment of the corporation's interest. In addition, the court attempted to simplify the
exercise of its judgment by providing several guidelines which focused
attention on the tangible costs and gains of the litigation. 187 Specifically, the court stated that, in reviewing the corporate interest in a
derivative suit seeking monetary damages, it would determine
whether the likely recovery, discounted for the probability of success,
was less than the tangible costs to the corporation (i.e., attorney fees
and other out-of-pocket expenses, including possible indemnity obligations). The court further stated that the intangible costs of distraction of company personnel and damage to goodwill for businesses
dealing with the general public should only be considered in the event
the expected gain was not substantial in comparison with shareholder
equity. Finally, the court stated that it would simply not consider
other intangible costs such as morale.
There are a number of problems with this approach. First, it is
unclear how much burden it will remove. In Joy, the court exercised
its judgment on the basis of the record before it and allowed the action to continue. Yet that appears to have been based more upon the
184. Abella v. Universal Leaf Tobacco Co., 546 F. Supp. 795 (E.D. Va. 1982).
185. 692 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S.Ct. 1498 (1983).
186. Joy v. North, 519 F. Supp. 1312 (D. Conn. 1981), rev'd, 692 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 103 S. Ct. 1498 (1983).
187. 692 F.2d at 892-93.
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court's off-the-cuff view that the claims might have some merit, rather
than upon a careful review of its own criteria.1 88 Moreover, by limiting consideration of intangible costs, the Joy decision ignored factors
which sometimes may be more important in the long run to the corporation than either the out-of-pocket costs or gains involved in the
suit. 189

Commentators who advocate resort to the courts' judgment have

been no more successful in devising a way to alleviate the burden of
court review while retaining its full effectiveness. Like Joy, the ALI
Draft Principles attempts to refine Zapata by suggesting guidelines to
govern the exercise of judicial judgment. For the most part, these
guidelines consist of urging the courts to demand detailed corroboration of various claimed costs to the corporation which should then be
balanced against the probable recovery and any possible frustration of
public policy.190 This is hardly a prescription for easing the difficulty
of review. The ALI Draft makes one proposal that seemingly could
be used to alleviate the burden on the court-remanding the matter

back to the committee for further analysis and consideration. 191 This
192
borrows from a suggestion made by Professors Coffee and Schwartz
based on a model used in reviewing decisions of administrative agencies. It is unlikely that this approach, however, will prevent the effects of structural bias; it would simply require the litigation
committee to work harder to justify its preconceived decision. That
task may take more time and energy (all at the expense of the corpo188. For example, while the court states that recovery might run into several million dollars,
which it further states would far exceed the potential cost of the litigation to the corporation, id. at
879, this is not the calculation which the court's opinion calls for. The opinion calls on the court to
compare the likely damages "discounted by the probability for a finding of liability" against the costs
of the suit. Id. at 892.
189. See S. Solomont & Sons Trust v. New England Theatres Operating Corp., 326 Mass. 99,
93 N.E.2d 241 (1950) (concern expressed that the derivative suit might cause the corporation to lose
the services of managers who had restored the company to profitability).
Judging by the limited experience in Abella and Joy, it is possible to speculate that courts will
seek to avoid extensive adjudication over the corporate interest through the expedient of primarily
focusing their attention on the merits of the plaintiff's claims. The difficulty with this approach is
that the motion for summary judgment is the procedure designed to screen out nonmeritorious
claims before trial. Therefore, to the extent that the exercise of judicial judgment comes to mean
simply determining whether the plaintiff has a chance of prevailing at trial (i.e., whether there exists
a material issue of fact), it is duplicative. To the extent that a different standard is used, it is unclear
what should make the courts more able to resolve factual controversies without benefit of trial in a
derivative suit than they are able to do in other litigation.
190. ALl Draft Principles, supra note 10, § 7.03 comments b, c, & f.
191. Id. § 7.03 comment d.
192. Coffee & Schwartz, supra note 14, at 324-26.

1985]

DERIVATIVE SUITS

ration) but, as noted above, would not be impossible in most cases. 193
Moreover, if one were looking for a model of expeditious decisionreconmaking, the practice of remanding matters for administrative
194
start.
should
one
place
the
hardly
siderations is
2.

The Decision to Settle

In allowing the courts to determine whether a derivative suit is in
the corporation's interest, the Zapata opinion took comfort in the
similar function played by the courts in approving settlements. 195 A
review of the experience with judicial approval of settlements suggests
that this solace was misplaced. As noted earlier, 196 this experience by
no means shows that the courts' judgment can be obtained without
lengthy and burdensome adjudication. Moreover, after years of experience with court approval of settlements, there remains a lingering
sense of dissatisfaction with the results obtained. 197 Therefore, instead of borrowing from the model of judicial approval of settlements,
it may be better to reexamine whether even there the use of the courts'
judgment provides a satisfactory solution.
While hopefully preventing the worst cases of private settlements
at the expense of the corporation, 198 judicial approval of settlement
agreements has been a far from ideal protection of the corporation's
interest. A settlement should be the result of arm's-length bargaining
between the parties. However, for reasons noted above, none of the
parties to a settlement agreement may fully represent the corporation's interest. This leaves the requirement of court approval to fill
193. See Abella v. Universal Leaf Tobacco Corp., 546 F. Supp. 795, 799 (E.D. Va. 1982) (noting the "relative ease with which a committee could construct a record of apparently diligent investigation after having predetermined the outcome").
194. See Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
406 U.S. 950 (1972) (16 year proceeding); G. RoBINSON & E. GELLHORN, THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCESS 830-31 (1974).
195. Zapata, 430 A.2d at 787-88.
196. See supra text accompanying notes 175-79.
197. E.g., Alleghany Corp. v. Kirby, 333 F.2d 327, 347 (2d Cir. 1964), aff'd en banc by an
equally divided court, 390 F.2d 311 (2d Cir. 1965) (Friendly, J., dissenting), cert. dismissed, 384 U.S.
28 (1966).
198. See In re Pittsburgh & Lake Erie R.R., 543 F.2d 1058 (3d Cir. 1976) (proposed settlement
would actually cost the corporation $2,100,000); Normal v. McKee, 390 F.2d 29 (N.D. Cal. 1968),
afl'd, 431 F.2d 769 (9th Cir. 1970) (defendants agreed to pay plaintiff's attorney directly in a settlement consisting largely of requiring them to do what they were already obligated to do); Fistel v.
Christman, 133 F.2d 300 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) (attorney paid to dismiss § 16(b) action). But see Jones,
supra note 2, at 556-58 (reporting an approved settlement which cost the corporation between
$208,000 and $318,000).
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the breach. Yet, such after-the-fact review is no substitute for hard
bargaining during the negotiations by someone who would have represented only the corporation. It must be remembered that the court
will review a settlement agreement only to verify that it falls within
some range which might be considered fair to the company. This is
quite a broad range, especially given the courts' natural reluctance to
upset a settlement.1 99 Thus, the review will not determine whether
harder bargaining could have produced a better result.
In fact, the courts could not realistically apply a more stringent
standard of review even if they chose. For one thing, application of
such a standard could turn the settlement hearing into a full-scale
trial which it is the purpose of settlement to avoid. Moreover, an
attempt to undertake a more exacting review will often be hampered
by the lack of effective opposition to the proposal. The plaintiff and
2
defendant naturally will join hands in supporting their agreement. 00
Unless other parties appear, all information received by the court will
be from those in favor of approval; hardly a procedure conducive to
effective judicial review. 20 1 In this context, objecting stockholders
20 2
who come before the court could serve an important function.
However, there is normally little incentive for opposition to appear.
The burden is great, and there will usually be little reward. 20 3 An
incentive is created by awarding successful objectors attorney's
fees, 2°4 but this makes the objector subject to the same conflict of interest problems that exist for the plaintiff in a derivative suit. Relying
on objectors, moreover, leads to much wasted time. For example,
they may need to retake extensive discovery in order to effectively
199. See Haudek, supra note 127, at 793.

200. Alleghany Corp. v. Kirby, 333 F.2d 327, 347 (2d Cir. 1964), afird en banc by an equally
divided court, 340 F.2d 311 (2d Cir. 1964) (Friendly, J., dissenting), cert. dismissed, 384 U.S. 28
(1966).
201. Id. See also G.A. Enter. v. Leisure Living Communities, Inc., 517 F.2d 24, 27 (1st Cir.
1975) ("A court's ability to oversee complex litigation and understand all its nuances is limited by its
many other duties. In an adversary system a court must rely on the parties.").
202. Objectors come before the court at the invitation extended by the notice of the settlement
hearing. While not a party to the underlying action, they have a right to participate in the hearing,
including cross-examining the proponents' witnesses, and appealing approval of the settlement.
They may also be granted leave to take discovery and present evidence. See, e.g., Girsh v. Jepson,
521 F.2d 153 (3d Cir. 1975); Wolf v. Nazareth Enter., 303 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1962).
203. Haudek, supra note 127, at 805.
204. Objectors will be awarded fees if they succeed in improving the settlement. E.g., White v.
Auerbach, 500 F.2d 822 (2d Cir. 1974). This means they walk a fine line between failing to upset the
settlement as it stands and causing the settlement to be rejected completely; in either event they will
get nothing.
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challenge the plaintiff's assessment of the merits of pursuing the
case. 205 Finally, and most importantly, there is no way for the court
to reconstruct what agreement might have been reached barring any
conflict of interest. The only way to be sure that the agreement equals
the product of arm's-length negotiations is for the court to become a
party to the negotiations on behalf of the corporation. 20 6 Such a parti20 7
san role, however, would be inappropriate for a judge.

Court review of settlement agreements has another failing as
well. As noted earlier, 20 8 the plaintiff's attorney may oppose a settlement which would be in the corporation's interest to accept. If that
occurs, judicial approval will be useless to protect the company's interest unless the proposed settlement will come before the court despite the plaintiff's opposition. Perhaps a procedure could be created
whereby rejected offers are also subject to judicial evaluation. In this
manner, the court would become a substitute for a true plaintiff to
whom an attorney is obligated to present all written settlement offers. 209 Carried to its ultimate logic, the court could be empowered to
require the plaintiff's attorney to make offers or counter-offers to the
defendants. As already noted, however, the court is not designed to
undertake such a partisan role. Another approach to obtaining court
review, despite the plaintiff's opposition, is to have the agreement entered into by the board of directors who would then seek judicial approval.210 While this approach is presently available, it is rarely
205. See Girsh v. Jepson, 521 F.2d 153 (3d Cir. 1975); Pergament v. Frazer, 93 F. Supp. 13
(E.D. Mich. 1950), affid sub nom., Masterson v. Pergament, 203 F.2d 315 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
346 U.S. 832 (1953); Forman v. Chester, 39 Del. Ch. 484, 167 A.2d 442 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
206. See Haudek, supra note 127, at 771-72.
207. E.g., Contreras v. Tweedy, Browne & Knapp, 76 F.R.D. 39 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Blank v.
Talley Indus., 64 F.R.D. 125 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Levan v. Mississippi River Corp., 59 F.R.D. 353, 361
(S.D.N.Y. 1973), affid on opinion below sub nom., Wesson v. Mississippi River Corp., 486 F.2d 1398
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1112 (1973) (not the function of the court to "enter into negotiations
with the litigants in the hope of improving the terms of the settlement"). But see Winkelman v.
General Motors Corp., 48 F. Supp. 490, modified, 48 F. Supp. 500 (S.D.N.Y. 1942) (court-approved
settlement on condition that $500,000 be added).
208. See supra text accompanying notes 118-21.
209. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT OF THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA Rule 5-105
(1982).
210. See Denicke v. Anglo Cal. Nat'l Bank, 141 F.2d 285 (9th Cir.), cerL denied, 323 U.S. 739
(1944). The board might also settle without presenting the agreement to the court for approval.
Wolf v. Barkes, 348 F.2d 994 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 941 (1965). In that event, the settlement will presumably be brought before the court by the defendants as a defense to the action
against them.
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used 211 because it may simply result in trading lawsuits. So long as
any defendants remain on the board, the settlement agreement constitutes an interested director transaction. 212 As a result, court review of
the settlement-either upon request for its approval or when the defendants attempt to assert it as a defense to the action against themmay require the same detailed scrutiny as would the actions challenged in the underlying suit.21 3 Moreover, because of the difficulty in
assessing the fairness of an agreement which does not reflect any semblance of arm's-length negotiation, courts may be reluctant to accept
a settlement reached over the objections of the plaintiff when the
21 4
board is not independent.
Two final problems entailed in the courts' determination of the
corporation's interest-both in dismissal and in settlement-should
be noted. First, these decisions may require repeated involvement by
the court. A decision against dismissal may need reconsideration depending on the progress of the suit.215 A decision disapproving a settlement will probably result in the need to consider another
agreement. 21 6 Even a decision dismissing the suit as against the corporation's interest might be reconsidered if circumstances change
before the statute of limitations has run.21 7 This multiplies the potential for endless litigation on these matters.
A second problem will occur in those jurisdictions where individual cases are calendared to a single judge for all proceedings. When
deciding whether a derivative suit serves the corporation's interest or
211. Buxbaum, Conflict-of-InterestStatutes and the Needfor a Demand on Directorsin Derivative Actions, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 1122, 1133 (1980).
212. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 310 (West 1982); DEL. GEN. CORP. LAW § 144 (1983);
N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 713 (McKinney 1963 & Supp. 1984-85).
213. See Denicke v. Anglo Cal. Nat'l Bank, 141 F.2d 285 (9th Cir. 1944) (nine days of hearings
producing a record of over 2000 pages); Goodwin v. Castleton, 19 Wash. 2d 748, 144 P.2d 725
(1944) (two-week trial on the fairness of the settlement accepted by the board).
214. See Clark v. Lomas & Nettleton Fin. Corp., 625 F.2d 49 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 480
U.S. 1029 (1981); Haudek, supra note 127, at 771 ("derivative settlements concluded over the head
of the complaining stockholder are extremely rare and should remain so").
215. See Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981).
216. See, e.g., Upson v. Otis, 155 F.2d 606, 614 (2d Cir. 1946); Berger v. Dyson, 111 F. Supp.
533 (D.R.I. 1953).
217. This depends on whether the prior dismissal will preclude further litigation on the
grounds of res judicata. See Cramer v. General Tel. & Elec. Corp., 443 F. Supp. 516 (E.D. Pa.
1977), aff'd on othergrounds, 582 F.2d 259 (3d Cir. 1978); Parkoff v. General Tel. & Elec. Corp., 53
N.Y.2d 412, 425 N.E.2d 820, 442 N.Y.S.2d 432 (1981). A determination of the company's interest
in pursuing a suit, while certainly estopping further litigation on the same question, is not a
determinaton on the merits of the company's claim. Thus, if circumstances clearly change to render
it in the company's interest to bring the action, it may be argued that the action is not barred.
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whether a settlement is best for the corporation, the judge should normally seek to identify with the interests of the company. This could
create a problem of bias if the same judge handles later proceedings in
the suit, including trial. Bringing in additional judges, however, increases the burden on judicial resources.
D.

The Shareholders

A final alternative sometimes used to determine the corporation's
interest in proceeding with a derivative suit is to have the shareholders as a whole vote on the question. 2 18 This alternative is implemented in federal courts and in many states through the adoption of a
demand rule which is analogous to the demand on the board requirement addressed earlier. 2 19 Under this rule, the plaintiff must allege
what steps he or she took to demand action from the shareholders, "if
necessary," or the reason for not taking such steps. 220 If the shareholders vote against bringing suit, either in response to the plaintiff's
demand or otherwise, the issue is then raised (much as in the case of a
refusal by the board to sue) as to the effect of the shareholders'
decision.
There are several grounds that may excuse demand on the shareholders or may undermine the effect accorded the shareholder vote.
To begin with, a demand is clearly futile and a vote ineffectual if the
prospective defendants own a majority of the stock. 2 21 Allegations
that they own a "controlling" block, albeit less than a majority, how218. On rare occasions, shareholders also may be asked to vote on the settlement of a derivative lawsuit. E.g., Prince v. Bensinger, 244 A.2d 89, 94-96 (Del. Ch. 1968). The outcome of such a
vote may strongly influence the court in its review of the settlement, but does not preclude the
necessity of the court's finding the agreement to be fair. See, eg., id.; Glicken v. Bradford, 35 F.R.D.
144 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
219. See supra text accompanying notes 15-26.
220. E.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1; ARIz. R. Civ. P. 23.1; MINN. R. Civ. P. 23.06; OHIO R. Civ.
P. 23. 1. The "if necessary" language in Rule 23.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is generally interpreted as referring the federal court to the law of the state of incorporation to decide if
demand on the shareholders will be required. E.g., Jacobs v. Adams, 601 F.2d 176 (5th Cir. 1979);
Brody v. Chemical Bank, 482 F.2d 1111 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1104 (1973). Where the
action is brought for violation of a federal statute, however, the court might not apply the state rule
if its effect would be to undermine the policies behind the federal law. Levitt v. Johnson, 334 F.2d
815 (1st Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 961 (1965). Of course, the same meaning cannot be
ascribed to the "if necessary" term when used in the state rules of court. Many states have abolished
the requirement of making a demand on shareholders. See, eg., CAL. CORP. CODE § 800 (West
1977) (amended 1982); N.Y. Bus. CORP. CODE § 626 (McKinney 1963). The ALI Draft Principles
also recommends abolition of this rule. ALI Draft Principles, supra note 10, § 7.02.
221. E.g., G.A. Enter. v. Leisure Living Communities, Inc. 66 F.R.D. 123 (D. Mass. 1974),
affid on other grounds, 517 F.2d 24 (1st Cir. 1975); Heilbrunn v. Hanover Equities Corp., 259 F.
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ever, have received a conflicting response from the courts. 222
A second ground sometimes urged by plaintiffs is the expense
and difficulty involved in soliciting large numbers of stockholders.
The reactions of the courts to this excuse have also been mixed.
Many agree that it would be too burdensome to expect the plaintiff to
make a demand on numerous scattered shareholders. 223 Other courts,
however, refuse to recognize such an excuse. 224 An interesting issue,
not posed in these cases, is what effect may be given to a shareholder
vote not to sue if demand was excused because of this burden. 225 At
first glance, the burden which releases the plaintiff from making demand as a prerequisite to filing suit has nothing to do with preventing
a shareholder vote from being given effect. However, on further consideration, this conclusion seems highly questionable. If the plaintiff
cannot afford the cost of making demand, he or she probably cannot
afford the cost of opposing an effort to solicit a shareholder vote not to
sue by the defendants. In all probability, the result will be a vote
against the suit based on one-sided information.
Probably the most common excuse is to argue that the defendants' actions constitute conduct which cannot be ratified by the stockholders, such as fraud. 226 The plaintiff then will reason that a
shareholder vote not to sue would be equivalent to ratifying the fraud
and thus cannot be given effect. The plaintiff will then argue that a
vote to sue would add little to the action and that it would be unrealistic to demand that he or she engage in a proxy contest to force removal of the board. The argument concludes that demand would,
therefore, be a futile exercise.
Supp. 936 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Fornaseri v. Cosmosart Realty & Bldg. Corp., 96 Cal. App. 549, 274 P.
597 (1929).
222. Compare Gottesman v. General Motors Corp., 268 F.2d 194 (2d Cir. 1959) (ownership of
controlling block by defendant may excuse demand) with Carroll v. New York, New Haven & Hart-

ford R.R., 141 F. Supp. 456 (D. Mass. 1956) (contra) and Levitan v. Stout, 97 F. Supp. 105 (W.D.
Ky. 1951) (same).

223. E.g., Levett v. Johnson, 334 F.2d 815 (1st Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 961 (1965);
Gottesman v. General Motors Corp., 268 F.2d 194 (2d Cir. 1959); Weiss v. Sunasco, Inc., 316 F.
Supp. 1197 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
224. E.g., Quirke v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 277 F.2d 705 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 363 U.S.

845 (1960); Haffer v. Voit, 219 F.2d 704 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 832 (1955); Saigh v. Busch,
396 S.W.2d 9 (Mo. Ct. App. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 942 (1966).
225. This would occur if the vote was solicited by the defendants.
226. E.g., Mayer v. Adams, 38 Del. Ch. 298, 141 A.2d 458 (S. Ct. 1958); S. Solomont & Sons
Trust, Inc. v. New England Theatres Operating Corp., 326 Mass. 99, 93 N.E.2d 241 (1950); Conti-

nental Sec. Co. v. Belmont, 206 N.Y. 7, 99 N.E. 138 (1912); Claman v. Robertson, 164 Ohio St. 61,
128 N.E.2d 429 (1955).
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The courts have also differed in their reactions to this argument.
To begin with, there is some difference of opinion as to what conduct
stockholders can and cannot ratify. 2 27 Even when the conduct cannot
be ratified, several courts, led by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts,
reason that the shareholders may still determine that it is not worthwhile for the company to sue. 22 8 Other courts, most notably in New
York and Delaware, noting that the effect of the two actions is the
same, 229 disagree. 230 In the end, however, this entire controversy
tends to distract from the real issue: Are shareholders capable of determining by vote the corporation's interest in derivative litigation regardless of the nature of the purportedly wrongful conduct involved?
1.

ShareholderDecisions in the Widely Held Corporation

The problems with deciding by shareholder vote whether a derivative suit should be initiated, dismissed, or settled vary with the
number of stockholders in the corporation. In a widely held corporation, such a shareholder determination is likely to be both expensive
and ill informed. To gain some idea of the potential expense involved,
it may be useful to examine outlays reported to have been made on
proxy solicitations in contested elections for directors. Costs in these
contests often run into the tens or hundreds of thousands of dollars
23 1
and on occasion will even exceed the one million dollar mark.
There is no reason to expect that the expense of obtaining a shareholder vote on pursing a derivative suit, assuming both sides were
making a serious effort to present their positions to a widely scattered
body of stockholders, would be any smaller. If the plaintiff is to have
any chance of convincing the shareholders to support a suit against
227. Compare Continental Sec. Co. v. Belmont, 206 N.Y. 7, 99 N.E. 138 (1912) (fraud not
ratifiable) with Claman v. Robertson, 164 Ohio St. 61, 128 N.E.2d 429 (1955) (contra).
228. E.g., S. Solomont & Sons Trust, Inc. v. New England Theatres Operating Corp., 326
Mass. 99, 93 N.E.2d 241 (1950); Claman v. Robertson, 164 Ohio St. 61, 128 N.E.2d 429 (1955).
229. Technically, this is incorrect. For example, a vote not to sue should not preclude the
shareholders from changing their minds and instituting an action so long as the statute of limitations
has not run. On the other hand, baring fraud in its inducement, a ratification cannot be rescinded.
Note, Corporation:Derivative Suits: Effect of Shareholders' Vote Not to Sue, 39 CALIF. L. RaV. 268
(1931). This distinction, however, is extremely unlikely to ever have any practical consequences.
230. E.g., Rogers v. American Can Co., 305 F.2d 297 (3d Cir. 1962); Mayer v. Adams, 38 Del.
Ch. 298, 141 A.2d 458 (S.Ct. 1958); Continental Sec. Co. v. Belmont, 206 N.Y. 7, 99 N.E. 138
(1912).
231. See Eisenberg, Access to the Corporate Proxy Machinery, 83 HARV. L. Rv. 1489, 150001, 1501 n.49 (1970) (listing 13 contests with expenses ranging from $30,000 to $2,183,733); H.
HENN & J.ALEXANDER, supra note 3, § 196 n.37 (1978 proxy contest involving Kennecott Copper
Corp. cost Kennecott between $2.4 and $4.2 million).
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the current management, it will take an elaborate and hence costly
campaign. 232 Utilizing the shareholder proposal provision of the Securities and Exchange Commission's Proxy Rules2 33 is not a realistic
alternative. The plaintiff can hardly present the charges, let alone the
supporting evidence, in the 500 word statement which the Rule requires the corporation to disseminate.2 34 On the other side, the defendants are unlikely to sit idly and forego efforts to present their view
235
to the shareholders.
Utilizing such a costly system to make litigation decisions is
completely counterproductive. As noted before, a primary concern
behind these decisions is the avoidance of cost to the corporation.
Yet, a proxy contest may be as expensive as litigation, and much or all
of this expense could ultimately be borne by the company. 23 6 Moreover, the proxy contest may only be the beginning of expense. If the
suit goes forward, the cost of soliciting the shareholder decision will
simply add to the expense of litigating. There may also be a need for a
number of votes concerning any given suit. For example, the losing
side might argue that changed circumstances warranted a reconsideration of the shareholder vote on whether or not to proceed with the
action. Finally, the end result of such proxy contests might simply be
to spawn new litigation over the accuracy of the proxy solicitation
237
materials.
Of course, no one really expects costly proxy contests to be
waged over litigation decisions. Rather, the more probable result of
the potential expense will be to deter plaintiffs from bringing derivative actions. 238 Since neither the shareholders nor anyone else will
then determine whether the suit is in the best interests of the corpora232. See Levitt v. Johnson, 334 F.2d 815 (1st Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 961 (1965);

Pomerantz v. Clark, 101 F. Supp. 341 (D. Mass. 1951).
233. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (1984).
234. See Levitt v. Johnson, 334 F.2d 815, 819 n.4 (1st Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 961

(1965). For an illustration of an attempt to present charges in this manner, see Rogers v. American
Can Co., 305 F.2d 297, 299-300 (3d Cir. 1962).
235. Cf Schwartz, The Public-InterestProxy Contest: Reflections on Campaign GM, 69 MIcH.
L. REv. 419, 428-29 (1971) (describing the management of General Motors' response to shareholder
proposals made by the Project on Corporate Responsibility).
236. See, e.g., Steinberg v. Adams, 90 F. Supp. 604 (S.D.N.Y. 1950); Rosenfeld v. Fairchild
Engine & Airplane Corp., 309 N.Y. 168, 128 N.E.2d 291 (1955).
237. The plaintiff might bring either another derivative action or a direct action when charging
a violation of Rule 14a-9's strictures on misleading proxy solicitations. J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377
U.S. 426 (1964).
238. See Pomerantz v. Clark, 101 F. Supp. 341 (D. Mass 1951).
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tion, the consequence will be that derivative actions which may be
worthwhile for the company will never be brought.
In addition to being expensive, litigation decisions by shareholder
vote in a widely held corporation will be of questionable quality. An
intelligent decision regarding the corporate interest in pursuing or settling a derivative action requires an assessment both of the merits and
of various possible costs and gains to the corporation from the litigation. To obtain any idea as to the merits, a decisionmaker needs to
know the facts and the law involved. He or she should hear what the
witnesses and key documents say and have the opportunity to consult
with an attorney and others familiar with corporate affairs.2 39 An
evaluation of the possible gains and costs to the corporation requires
2 40
even more data, some of which were outlined earlier in this Article.
Assuming this information is made available, it will take considerable
effort by the individual shareholder to read and digest it.241
Shareholders in a widely held corporation, however, generally
lack both the necessary time and information to make these decisions.
Their information will come through the proxy solicitation materials
which may, at best, present the arguments of both sides.242 Asking
the shareholders to make an informed decision on this basis is a little
like asking a jury to adjourn and reach a decision immediately after
opening statements. Nor would it be economically worthwhile for
most shareholders to spend the time necessary to conduct an investigation into the facts or to consult with an attorney. No matter what
the result of the suit, the difference in value per share is usually minor.2 43 Indeed, for the small shareholder, it is probably not worth his
or her time to even read the solicitation materials carefully. 244 Further, in many cases, the shareholders will only receive one-sided information. The plaintiff typically lacks the resources to match the
defendants (whose efforts likely will be financed by the corporation) in
presenting his or her view to the shareholders on whether to initiate
239. See Mayer v. Adams, 38 Del. Ch. 298, 141 A.2d 458 (S. Ct. 1958); Leavell, The Shareholders as Judges of Alleged Wrongs by Directors, 35 TUL. L. REV. 331, 349 (1961).
240. See supra text accompanying notes 149-60.
241. By way of comparison, one might note the length of time which directors on special
litigation committees report they spent in reviewing evidence on the corporation's interest. See supra
note 171 and cases cited therein.
242. Leavell, supra note 239, at 353-54, 354 n.145.
243. See supra note 93 and cases cited therein.
244. Cf Eliasberg v. Standard Oil Co., 23 N.J. Super 431, 92 A.2d 862, 868 (1952), afi'd, 97
A.2d 437 (1953) ("Many a stockholder relegates to the wastebasket the literature he receives from
corporations upon whose dividends he depends for income.").
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or continue the suit.245 If the shareholders are being asked to vote on
a settlement agreement, they presumably will be presented with a
united front in its favor.
Requiring that litigation decisions be made by shareholder vote
might still be justified if there were some indication that this is what
the shareholders really want. After all, it is their money which is
ultimately at stake. However, there is simply no evidence that shareholders wish to make these decisions. Almost all shareholders in a
widely held corporation purchase stock as an investment in the management decisions of others, not to make business decisions through
proxy votes. 246 The rational shareholder will realize that he or she

lacks the information necessary to make an intelligent decision on the
wisdom of derivative litigation and that it is not cost effective to spend
the time attempting to acquire and digest the required data. Even if a
vote is taken and a large percentage of shareholders participate, this
will not prove that shareholders wish to make these decisions. There
are many reasons for shareholders to vote which do not indicate an
approval of the process. They may vote out of a sense of obligation
with no desire that the issue be placed before them. Moreover, stockholders who feel the matter is inappropriate for shareholder determination are left no real choice and may, therefore, vote on the rationale
that since they cannot stop the process, they may as well get their say,
ill informed as it is.
2. ShareholderDecisions in the Closely Held Corporation
The problem is the opposite for a shareholder vote in a closely
held corporation. In such a corporation, the shareholders are likely
to be active participants in the business or else related to the individuals who are. 24 7 Thus, a shareholder decision on initiating, dismissing,

or settling a derivative suit would normally not be either expensive to
obtain or ill informed. 248 However, these close contacts among the
shareholders will also normally make them too involved to provide a
disinterested assessment of the corporation's interest in derivative litigation. Such litigation involving a closely held corporation is, in all
likelihood, the outgrowth of a dispute among competing factions of
245. See Pomerantz v. Clark, 101 F. Supp. 341 (D. Mass. 1951).
246. E.g., Hessen, A New Model of Corporations: A Contractualand PrivatePropertyModel, 30
HASTINGS

L.J. 1327, 1344-46 (1979).

247. F. O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS § 1.07 (2d ed. 1971).
248. Leavell, supra note 239, at 350.
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shareholders. 249 As a result, the shareholders' votes will be influenced, if not dictated, by their established alliances rather than by any
2 50
objective assessment of the company's interest.
The end effect of having the shareholders of a closely held corporation determine the fate of derivative actions by vote may simply be
to preclude the minority faction from taking up the banner of corporate causes of action in its fight with the majority. This may not make
much difference if the minority has other remedies, for example, direct actions against the majority for breach of its fiduciary duties to
2 52
the minority251 or an action for dissolution of the corporation.
However, if the minority lacks such remedies, 2 53 it would be unfair to
prevent them from asserting legitimate corporate claims against the
majority's nominees by virtue of the majority's vote.
This problem cannot be solved by simply excluding the votes of
"interested" shareholders. Realistically applied, this would preclude
the counting of most, if not all, of the votes. Some courts have more
narrowly interpreted what constitutes a disabling interest and have
excluded only the votes of the defendants. 2 54 This approach, however, ignores the importance of family and other ties which will cause
a shareholder faction in a closely held corporation to stick together.
Moreover, there is no reason to consider the plaintiff or members of
his or her faction to be unbiased in determining the corporate interest.
The end result of realistically excluding all interested shareholders,
therefore, will typically be to leave no one to vote.
3.

ShareholderDecisions in Other Corporations

In between the extremes of the widely traded company and the
close corporation there may exist firms whose shares are not so dis249. See supra note 95 and cases cited therein.
250. Leavell, supra noted 239, at 351-52.
251. See, e.g., Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 370 Mass. 842, 353 N.E.2d 657
(1976); Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. 578, 328 N.E.2d 505 (1975).
252. See, e.g., Stumpf v. C.E. Stumpf & Sons, Inc., 47 Cal. App. 3d 230, 120 Cal. Rptr. 671
(1975); Gidwitz v. Lanzit Corrugated Box Co., 20 Ill. 2d 208, 170 N.E.2d 131 (1960). In addition,
under special circumstances, some courts have been willing to allow shareholders in closely held
corporations to assert what normally would be corporate claims in a direct action on their own
behalf. Watson v. Button, 235 F.2d 235 (9th Cir. 1956); Kirk v. First Nat'l Bank, 439 F. Supp. 1141
(M.D. Ga. 1977).
253. See Nelkin v. H.J.R. Realty Corp., 25 N.Y.2d 543, 255 N.E.2d 713, 307 N.Y.S.2d 454
(1969) (in refusing to dissolve the corporation, the court stated that the plaintiff's claim could be
adequately adjudicated in a derivative action).
254. Carroll v. New York, New Haven & Hartford R.R., 141 F. Supp. 456 (D. Mass. 1956);
Caldwell v. Eubanks, 326 Mo. 185, 30 S.W.2d 976 (1930).
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persed as to preclude relatively inexpensive and well-informed decisionmaking and yet not so closely held as to preclude an objective
assessment of the corporation's interest. There are two possible types
of companies which might fit this description. First, many corporations have more than, say, the thirty to thirty-five shareholders often
used as a cut-off for statutory treatment as a close corporation, 255 but
less than the 500 which triggers reporting obligations for public companies under the 1934 Securities Exchange Act.2 56 Second, even when
a company has a much greater number of shareholders, the majority
of shares could be held by relatively few parties. 257 These large holders may be either wealthy individuals or, increasingly, institutional
2 58
investors.
In either type of corporation, in a given case, it may be possible
to adequately inform disinterested shareholders with a majority of the
stock about the suit without undue expense. The problem lies in determining when such a case is present. There simply are no easily
applied criteria to determine if the shareholder constituency of a corporation can provide both objective and well-informed decisions regarding derivative litigation. For example, when a controlling
number of shares is held by a small group of individuals, there may be
a conflict of interest problem in a shareholder vote regarding a suit
against management. This is particularly likely since the holders of
the controlling block of shares presumably selected (and, indeed, may
259
comprise) the managers whose actions are under attack.
There are also problems with relying on institutional investors to
determine the corporate interest in a derivative suit. For one thing,
they may be particularly disinclined toward assuming this role. Traditionally, such investors have been hesitant to perform any oversight
function, preferring instead to sell their shares if dissatisfied with
255. E.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 158(a) (West 1977 & Supp. 1984); DEL. GEN. CORP. LAW
§ 342(a)(1) (1983).
256. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 12(g), 15 U.S.C. § 781(g) (1970). For an attempt to
estimate the number of corporations with between 10 to 500 shareholders, see M. EISENBERG, supra
note 43, at 39-40.
257. M. EISENBERG, supra note 43, at 43-51.

258. Id. at 52-56.
259. See, e.g., Meltzer v. Atlantic Research Corp., 330 F.2d 946 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 379
U.S. 841 (1964); Abramowitz v. Posner, 513 F. Supp. 120 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), aff'd, 672 F.2d 1025 (2d
Cir. 1982); Abbe v. Goss, 411 F. Supp. 923 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 286
F. Supp. 809 (D. Colo. 1968), modified and afl'd, 435 F.2d 1223 (10th Cir. 1970).
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*management. 260 Moreover, they may not provide a completely objective assessment of the company's interest. As managers of other people's money themselves, they may be unsympathetic to derivative
actions in general. 261 They may also have an ongoing business relationship with the corporation and thus be concerned about offending
262
its management.
Furthermore, the small shareholders could still cast important
swing votes despite large numbers of shares being concentrated in the
hands of a few. This would be the case, for example, when the large
holders do not own a majority or when the large shareholders disagree among themselves on the vote. Thus, the assumption that a
shareholder vote can be kept inexpensive and yet adequately informed
by simply ignoring the small holders may be unwarranted.
Without easily applied criteria to establish appropriate cases for
shareholder determination, the courts are still faced with the problem
of promoting extensive adjudication over who determines whether litigation is in the corporation's interest. Challenges to shareholder independence could create similar difficulties to those discussed earlier
when dealing with court review of director independence. 263 For a
court to determine when a shareholder decision will be overly expensive or ill informed could require the court to resolve difficult factual
issues and to speculate about the degree of shareholder commitment.
In either case, searching for the corporations in which shareholders
should vote on derivative suits is probably not worth the effort.
III. A

PROPOSAL: PROVISIONAL LITIGATION DIRECTORS

A. A Neutral Third Party
After reviewing the current contenders available to determine the
corporate interest in derivative suits, only one conclusion is compelling: None can be consistently relied upon to perform that task.
What is clearly needed is to introduce a new party into the equation,
260. Wharton School of Finance & Commerce, A Study of Mutual Funds in H.R. REP. No.
2274, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 26-27, 399-428 (1962).
261. See Manning, Book Review, 67 YALE L.J. 1477, 1486 (1968).
262. M. EISENBERG, supra note 43, at 57.
263. See supra text accompanying notes 69-88. See also Carroll v. New York, New Haven &
Hartford R.R., 141 F. Supp. 456 (D. Mass. 1956):

How far these interests would be under control of defendants in a showdown vote no one
can know. The Court will not receive a Gallup-poll type of evidence and issue a prophecy
based thereon. Men's votes on such matters as those here in issue cannot be predicted with
any accuracy.
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one who can make an objective and expeditious determination of what
is best for the company. While such an ideal may never be fully realized, a reasonable approximation would be achieved by having courts
appoint neutral individuals to undertake this duty in each pending
derivative lawsuit. At the least, such a system would be an improvement over the status quo.
This idea is not without substantial precedent. In a variety of
contexts, courts appoint individuals to determine and protect the interests of parties unable to do that for themselves. A guardian ad
litem is routinely appointed by the courts to protect the interests of
infants or other individuals who lack adequate mental capacity and
who are involved in actual or potential litigation.2 64 Under the Bankruptcy Act, courts are empowered to appoint a trustee, whose authority includes the prosecution of lawsuits on behalf of the debtor's
estate.2 6 5 When the debtor is a corporation, the actions prosecuted by
a trustee are often against former directors and officers 2 66-precisely
the sort of claims which typically would have been brought through a
derivative action had the corporation not gone into bankruptcy. Indeed, the occasional need for courts to appoint individuals charged
with the duty of protecting the corporate interest or the interests of its
shareholders or creditors is well recognized. Statutes in a number of
states enable the courts to appoint a custodian to take charge of a
corporation whose shareholders or directors are bound in a hopeless
deadlock to the prejudice of the company.2 67 As a less drastic remedy
for deadlock, statutes may allow the courts to appoint a provisional
director. 2 68 When a company is insolvent or threatened with immi264. E.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 17(c); CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 732 (West Supp. 1984). Courts
have repeatedly commented on the importance of such an appointment to protect the minor from
possible conflicts of interest with parents, attorneys, codefendants and others. E.g., M.S. v.
Wermers, 557 F.2d 170 (8th Cir. 1977); In re Air Crash Disaster Near Saigon, 476 F. Supp. 521
(D.C.D.C. 1979); Horacek v. Exon, 357 F. Supp. 71 (D. Neb. 1973); United States v. E.I. Dupont de
Nemours & Co., 13 F.R.D. 98 (N.D. Ill. 1952). The function of the guardian ad litem is to take
control of the litigation on behalf of his or her charge. See Noe v. True, 507 F.2d 9 (6th Cir. 1974);
De Los Santos v. Superior Court, 27 Cal. 3d 677, 613 P.2d 233, 166 Cal. Rptr. 172 (1980).
265. 11 U.S.C. § 323(b) (1982); Bankruptcy Rule 6009. For a discussion of the powers of
trustees to pursue an action on behalf of the debtor's estate, see 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 323
(15th ed. 1979).
266. E.g., Bailes v. Colonial Press, Inc., 444 F.2d 1241 (5th Cir. 1971); Irving Trust Co. v.
Deutsch, 73 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1934), cert. denied, 294 U.S. 708 (1935); Gerdes v. Reynolds, 28
N.Y.S.2d 622 (Sup. Ct. 1941). See also In re Penn Central Sec. Litig., 335 F. Supp. 1026 (E.D. Pa.
1971) (trustees were held entitled to control a derivative action brought on behalf of a bankrupt
corporation).
267. E.g., DEL. GEN. CORP. LAW §§ 226, 352 (1969), VA. CODE § 13.1-94 (1978).
268. E.g., DEL. GEN. CORP. LAW § 353 (1969); CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 308, 1802 (West 1982).
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nent insolvency due to the dissipation of its assets by its management,
courts may appoint a receiver. 269 The receiver may prosecute actions
against the former management on the corporation's behalf.270 Occasionally, plaintiffs in derivative actions will request that a receiver be
appointed to protect the corporation's assets during the pendency of
the suit.271
The idea of having neutral third parties determine the corporate
interest specifically in derivative suits is itself not new. One approach,
which is employed in England 272 and has been advocated for some
years in this country, 2 73 is to have public prosecutors investigate alleged wrongdoing by corporate officers or directors and, if necessary,
bring actions in the name of the corporation. There are several
problems, however, with utilitizing government prosecutors to press
claims on behalf of profit-making companies. For one thing, enforcement is likely to be limited to the most egregious cases. This, in fact,
has been the experience in England. 274 The public is unlikely to commit the necessary resources to prosecute every action (or even most
actions) which might be worthwhile from the standpoint of the corporations involved. 27 5 Indeed, it does not appear appropriate for the
public purse to fund the prosecution of such actions. These actions
are brought for the benefit of the corporation and its shareholders.
Any public benefit is attenuated at best. Therefore, the actions should
be financed by the corporation, not the public. 276 Moreover, the interests of the corporation and the public may diverge. For example, a
public prosecuter will be interested in deterring misconduct by setting
an example for the management of all other companies. Thus, he or
she should want maximum exposure for the action. A corporation's
interest, however, is justifiably more self-centered, and one concerned
269. E.g.,
270. E.g.,
325 Mass. 630,
271. E.g.,

Robinson v. Thompson, 466 S.W.2d 626 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971).
Barnes v. Andrews, 298 F. 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1924); Allied Freightways, Inc. v. Cholfin,
91 N.E.2d 765 (1950).
Barry v. Full Mold Process, Inc., No. 4740 (Del. Ch. 1975), reported in I DEL J.

CORP. LAW 202; Roach v. Maurgulies, 42 N.J. Super. 243, 126 A.2d 45 (1956).
272. R. PENNINGTON, COMPANY LAW 610-15 (4th ed. 1979).

273. E.g., Note, Visitational JurisdictionOver Corporationsin Equity, 49 HARV. L. REV. 369
(1936).
274. See L. GOWER, GOWER'S PRINCIPLES OF MODERN COMPANY LAW 680 (4th ed. 1979).

275. See ALI Draft Principles, supra note 10, at 220. See also Hornstein, supra note 2, at 31
n.177 (noting the lack of prosecutions by New York's Attorney General's office under a statute
empowering it to bring actions on behalf of New York corporations).
276. It is possible, however, to have the corporation (or the defendants if found liable) reimburse the government for its costs. This is provided for under the English Companies Act. R. PENNINGTON, supra note 272, at 614.
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about the corporation's interest must weigh the effect of the suit on its
277
public image.
Recently, the American Law Institute's Draft Principles proposed that courts might appoint independent litigation committees to
determine whether a derivative suit is against the corporate interest. 278 This is certainly a step in the right direction, but it does not go
far enough. For one thing, this suggestion is only broached as an
alternative solution if the corporation has no independent directors
with which to staff a litigation committee. Thus, courts will still find
themselves bogged down litigating issues of director independence
prior to the use of a judicially appointed panel. Moreover, the panel
would be appointed only upon the request of the corporation (which,
of course, means the defendants or their fellow directors). It is highly
doubtful that such a request will often be made since the ALI Draft
conceives of this panel as a body empowered to investigate corporate
books and records to ascertain the merits of the charges. 279 The defendants, whether guilty or innocent, are not likely to want this.280
Even when a panel is finally appointed, the ALI Draft fails to exploit
its potential fully. The panel's assigned function is only to determine
whether to continue the suit. The panel will apparently take no ongoing responsibility, such as the consideration of settlement proposals. 281 This is unfortunate, for, as noted earlier, the problems with
allowing the current contenders to determine the corporate interest go
beyond a decision over whether or not to dismiss. Finally, once the
panel makes its recommendation, it is subject to de novo review by
the courts.2 82 The result is to substantially resurrect the burdens of
judicial review.
A better approach is to have the courts automatically appoint a
277. See L. GOWER, supra note 277, at 671, 680 (noting the adverse effects to the company
from the publicity surrounding a Department of Trade investigation).
278. ALI Draft Principles, supra note 10, § 7.03f. See also Bishop, supra note 180, at 162
(suggesting that litigation committees might be appointed by the court or the SEC in order to avoid
the bias problem).
279. In order to undertake this investigation, § 7.03f gives the panel the power to issue subpoenas, although the panel is admonished to use this power sparingly. ALl Draft Principles, supra note
10, § 7.03 comment e.
280. Business Roundtable, supra note 134, at 58.
281. Section 7.05b of the ALI Draft Principles allows the court to inquire of the panel whether
it can recommend a specific settlement or a settlement range it would consider fair to the corporation. ALI Draft Principles, supranote 10, § 7.05b. Such speculation, however, as to the fairness of a
settlement in the abstract-as opposed to review of a negotiated settlement, or better yet, participation in the negotiations-is of limited utility.
282. ALI Draft Principles, supra note 10, § 7.03 comment e.
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panel of provisional litigation directors in every derivative suit. These
court-appointed directors would be charged with making all litigation
decisions for the corporation as the real plaintiff in the action. While
this proposal might be implemented through the courts' equity powers,28 3 it will probably require legislation because of the substantial
change it would work in the handling of derivative suits. Whichever
method is followed for implementation, fleshing out the proposal requires answering at least the following questions: (1) How will the
provisional litigation directors be appointed and compensated? (2)
What will be their powers and duties? (3) What will be the role of
other parties in determining the corporation's interest?
B.

Appointment and Compensation

The appointment and compensation of the provisional litigation
directors is potentially the Achilles' heel of the whole scheme. Only if
potential conflicts of interest can be eliminated through the manner in
which the panel is selected and paid will this system constitute an
improvement over the current contenders. Therefore, this subject requires initial consideration.
The appointment should be made after the defendants have answered the complaint. In this way, the court will not waste time if the
complaint is subject to demurrer. The ALI Tentative Draft suggests
that a panel of three be appointed. 2 84 This seems to be the best
number. A panel of one would be cheaper and perhaps more efficient,
but this puts too much weight on one appointment. In addition, having three members will smooth the transition in case one of the appointees dies or resigns before the case is completed. For these same
reasons, more than three members on the panel might be even better;
however, the marginal added advantage is probably not worth the additional expense.
The provisional litigation directors should be appointed by the
court. Alternatively, the plaintiff and the corporation's board of directors could each nominate one member of the panel, and the court
select the third. This is similar to a scheme often used in arbitration
agreements, 285 and it has the advantage of giving both sides direct
input into the panel's deliberations as well as knowledge of what is
283. Miller v. Register & Tribune Syndicate, 336 N.W.2d 709 (Iowa 1983).
284. ALI Draft Principles, supra note 10, § 7.03f.
285. See id. § 7.03 comment e.
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going on. 286 However, this would leave only one truly neutral provisional litigation director. To the extent decisions would be made in
which the plaintiff and defendants are in agreement (i.e., settlement),
the neutral member could be outvoted and the corporation's interest
inadequately protected. The more typical decision is one in which the
plaintiff's and the board's nominees would be antagonistic. In such
cases, the built-in partisanship may complicate the panel's operations.
On balance, it would seem that the court should appoint all three
members. Adequate input from the plaintiff and the corporation's
board can be solicited from their counsel.
The plaintiff and the corporation's board of directors should be
allowed to challenge the court's appointees. Challenges could be
made for cause under the same standards employed for challenging
the assignment of a judge to hear a case. 287 In addition, both parties
could be allowed one preemptory challenge as an additional screening
against possible bias. This is analogous to the system of judicial challenges used in California courts 288 and is unlikely to cause significant
delay or burden.
The provisional litigation directors should be picked from a
prescreened list. This would have two advantages over finding potential panel members after a derivative suit is filed. First, it would be
more efficient. Prospective appointees could be screened in advance
for bias, expertise, and their willingness to serve. This could be done
centrally for the entire court.2 89 Second, as the same appointees may
be used in more than one suit, they will gain experience and become
more familiar with members of the plaintiffs-bar. This latter factor is
most important because it provides an incentive for the plaintiff's attorney to deal candidly with the provisional litigation directors. Individuals selected for this list should have some familiarity with
litigation, in general, and corporate litigation, in particular. 290 Retired judges may be well suited to this task. Members of academia
might be another potential source of provisional litigation
286. This could be a disadvantage, however, if the defendants' nominee were to leak settlement
strategy.
287. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 144, 455(b)(1) (1982); Rowin v. State Bar of Ariz., 686 F.2d 692
(9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 2110 (1983).
288. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 170.6 (West 1982); Pappa v. Superior Court, 54 Cal. 2d 350,
353 P.2d 311, 5 Cal. Rptr. 703 (1960).
289. In this manner, there could be input from all the judges in a district coupled with greater
opportunity to solicit comments on prospective candidates.
290. While business experience is desirable, their decisions typically will require greater litigation expertise than pure business judgment.
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directors. 291
One idea that could be considered is to have three lists: A management-oriented list comprised of individuals experienced with corporate management; a plaintiffs-oriented list comprised of members of
the plaintiffs-bar or corporate reform advocates; and a neutral list.
One member of each list would then be appointed. This might have
the advantage of ensuring that different viewpoints would be brought
into the panel's deliberations. However, this can potentially create
problems similar to those caused by the plaintiff and the directors
each selecting one member.
The next concern is who should pay the provisional litigation
directors. 292 Presumably, the corporation should bear the expense
since the appointments are for the corporate benefit. In those jurisdictions with security for expenses statutes, the corporation may be indemnified for this expense by the plaintiff if he or she does not prevail.
Alternatively, the expense of the provisional directors could be made
a chargable cost of the suit for which the losing party must reimburse
the corporation. Even if the corporation is never reimbursed, the expense should not be overly burdensome. It is doubtful that such expense would be any larger than the costs incurred by the
investigations of special litigation committees.
This, in turn, raises the question of the amount to be paid to the
provisional litigation directors. It is important to structure the payment to minimize incentives either to prolong the case in order to
obtain further fees or to shirk participation because of inadequate
compensation. It may be impossible to avoid this problem completely; so much will depend on the integrity of the individuals selected. On balance, it is probably better to err on the side of less
rather than more compensation.
C.

Powers and Duties

After appointment, the panel's first task is to determine whether
the suit should go forward. However, the panel's responsibilities will
not end there-throughout the course of the suit the panel will continue to determine the corporation's interest. This means it will make
all decisions which those normally in charge of managing the corporation would make if the corporation had brought suit against an out291. It is hoped that this suggestion will not undermine the author's credibility.
292. It is reasonable to assume that we cannot consistently count on their altruism alone.
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sider. For example, even if the panel decides the suit should go
forward, it may at a later point decide to dismiss. It will also make
decisions regarding settlement. This need not be limited to an afterthe-fact review of a proposed agreement. Rather, the panel can become involved in the entire process of negotiating the agreement. The
plaintiff's attorney should be required to present all offers of settlement from the defendants, even those the attorney recommends rejecting. The plaintiffs attorney should further be required to obtain
authority from the panel before making any settlement offers to the
defendants. In addition, the panel should have the power to require
the plaintiffs attorney to present offers to the defendants. It might
even wish to have some or all of its members observe or participate in
settlement negotiations. By virtue of their continued involvement in
the settlement process, the provisional directors will provide much
greater protection of the corporation's interest than does the current
system of court review.
The provisional litigation directors should not limit their considerations to dismissing or settling the case, although these are certainly
their most critical decisions. They should also make a variety of other
judgments which must be made by a plaintiff in a lawsuit. These include decisions regarding the retention and role of plaintiff's counsel.
One problem created by the plaintiff shareholder's lack of a substantial economic interest in the suit is that he or she thereby lacks any
incentive to monitor and replace the attorney if necessary. The result
may be to lose possibly valid corporate claims because of poor performance (or, more likely, nonperformance) by the plaintiff's counsel.2 93 Under present law, one solution to the problem is to allow
other shareholders (with their counsel) to intervene or file additional
actions. 294 This may alleviate the danger of one poor counsel undermining the case through lack of diligence, but it creates other
problems in its place. Many attorneys may intervene in order to get a
free ride on the original attorney's diligence in finding the cause of
action. There may be a conflict among the various plaintiffs' counsel
293. See, e.g., Abella v. Universal Leaf Tobacco Co., 546 F. Supp. 795 (E.D. Va. 1982).
294. See, e.g., White v. British Type Investors, Inc., 130 N.J. Eq. 157, 21 A.2d 681 (1941);
Dresdner v. Goldman Sacks Trading Corp., 240 App. Div. 242, 269 N.Y.S. 360 (1934). Added
protection is provided by limiting the res judicata effect of a dismissal obtained when the derivative
plaintiff has provided inadequate representation. See Papilsky v. Berndt, 466 F.2d 251 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1088 (1972). While this may protect the corporate interest in some extreme
cases, it is hardly the most advantageous approach from the standpoint of the efficient administration of justice.
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over what role each will play. As each counsel attempts to perform

more tasks (and thereby increase his or her fees), there may be dupli295
cation and waste.
The provisional litigation directors can keep a check on the activities of plaintiffs counsel. They should be empowered to replace
counsel if they deem it to be in the best interests of the corporation.
With provisional litigation directors in charge, there is less reason to
allow intervention by other shareholders. If necessary, the panel
296 If
might simply hire other attorneys to aid in prosecuting the case.
there are multiple plaintiffs' attorneys, the panel should be empowered to allocate responsibilities among them. Indeed, the panel could
take the same role in making major strategy decisions as any intelligent and active client might. This could serve as a check on fee raising tactics, on the one hand, and failure to prosecute the action
297
diligently, on the other.
The provisional litigation directors should also have the power to
explore alternatives to litigation. Arbitration of the dispute might be
desirable from the corporation's standpoint. Plaintiff's counsel normally will have little incentive to suggest such an approach, however,
and arbitration of derivative claims may be of questionable validity
under current law. 298 One problem presently raised by arbitration is
295. Coffee, supra note 107, at 248-52. These problems of multiple counsel are not unique to
derivative litigation, but also plague class actions. Indeed, it was in an antitrust class action, In re
Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 98 F.R.D. 48 (E.D. Pa. 1983), that the most severe charges concerning
this sort of conduct were recently made.
296. However, even the panel should not be given unlimited access to the corporate treasury.
They should be required to obtain court approval before hiring any attorney. Cf Stafford v. Superior Court of San Francisco, 1 Cal. 2d 321, 34 P.2d 998 (1934) (guardian ad litem must have court
authorization to hire an attorney on behalf of ward). Moreover, additional attorneys should be hired
on a contingent fee basis, the same as the plaintiff's attorney, rather than obligate the corporation to
payment of additional attorney's fees. The court also should retain the final decision with respect to
awarding attorney's fees, although the recommendation of the panel would be expected to carry
great weight.
297. Another difficulty with multiple plaintiffs and counsel occurs when some favor and some
oppose acceptance of a settlement. See, eg., Mastersen v. Pergament, 203 F.2d 315 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 346 U.S. 832 (1953); Breswick & Co. v. Briggs, 135 F. Supp. 397 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). If all
plaintiffs must concur in the settlement, then one unreasonable individual can block any agreement.
If the defendants are allowed to negotiate with their weakest adversary, on the other hand, the
potential for abuse exists because court review cannot assure that the best agreement has been made.
The use of provisional litigation directors neatly avoids the problem.
298. See, eg., Lumsden v. Lumsden Bros. & Taylor, Inc., 242 App. Div. 852, 275 N.Y.S 221
(1934); Application of Diamond, 80 N.Y.S.2d 465 (Sup. Ct.), afl'd, 274 App. Div. 762, 79 N.Y.S.2d
924 (1948); Pfeiffer v. Berke, 4 Misc. 2d 918, 121 N.Y.S.2d 774 (1953). But see Lane v. Abel-Bey, 70
A.D.2d 838, 418 N.Y.S.2d 25 (1979) (arbitration of derivative claims is not against public policy
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the possibility that it could be used to mask a collusive settlement. 299
This problem will be alleviated by the presence of provisional litigation directors. Finally, these directors will not share the plaintiff
counsel's inherent aversion to arbitrating the claim.
As the preceding discussion suggests, the panel of provisional litigation directors is to function much as would the management of any
corporate client that had brought a lawsuit. It should work through
and control the plaintiff's attorney. For this reason, an attorney-client
privilege should apply to all communications between the panel and
the plaintiff's counsel. This will provide a further advantage over judicial determination of the corporate interest in matters such as settlement, since presently the plaintiff's counsel may be required to make a
statement in open court about prospects for the case-a statement
that might later be used against him if the settlement falls through. 3°°
It will be up to the plaintiff's attorney to show the panel that the
suit is worth pursuing. This should not be treated as an adversary
proceeding before the court, but rather as an attorney advising an independently minded client about whether or not to bring suit. The
corporation's directors, whether or not they are named as defendants,
might wish to present the panel with reasons for dropping the suit.
The panel may, in its discretion, allow such a presentation. This
should not become an out-of-court trial, but simply an informal attempt by the parties to resolve the dispute. In the course of their
presentation, the corporation's directors may wish to allow the panel
access to the company's books and records. However, it is not expected that the panel will undertake an extensive exploration of the
merits of the claim on its own. Nor should the panel have the power
to demand access to the corporation's books and records. It is up to
the plaintiff's attorney to conduct the investigation using the tools of
discovery. The panel is simply there to provide objective judgment. 30
when they involve a closely held corporation); Siegal v. Ribak, 43 Misc. 2d 7, 249 N.Y.S.2d 903

(1964) (same).
299. Cf Horn v. Gurewitz, 261 Cal. App. 2d 255, 262, 67 Cal. Rptr. 791, 796 (1968) ("Parties
who agree to arbitrate may expect not only to reap the advantages that flow from the use of that
nontechnical, summary procedure, but also to find themselves bound by an award reached by paths
neither marked nor traceable and not subject to judicial review.").
300. See Haudek, supra note 127, at 802.
301. It bears emphasis that providing objective judgment is not the same thing as acting as a
neutal tribunal-be that a judge, special master, or arbitrator. To be effective, the panel must work
with and through the plaintiff's attorney much as would corporate officers or in-house counsel if they
had ordered the suit. This would be inappropriate for a court to undertake even on an ex parte basis.
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D. The Role of the Other Parties
Finally, what should be the role of the other parties involved in
determining the corporation's interest in derivative litigation? The
board of directors should retain the ultimate decision in the vast bulk
of corporate litigation which does not involve claims against board
members or a party with a significant relationship to any board member. To protect the board's role in this area, derivative suits should
only be allowed when the plaintiff states a cause of action against a
board member or a significantly related party.302 If such a cause of
action is stated, then the board should have no further role in determining the company's interest. This means that no attempts will be
made to ascertain the existence of independent directors.
At first glance, such a "one bad apple" rule303 may seem overly
broad. Yet the difficuties involved in attempting to ascertain which
directors can objectively determine the corporate interest in a suit
against any of their colleagues makes such a clear-cut rule the most
efficient approach. Given the protection of the corporate interest
achieved by appointment of a panel of provisional litigation directors,
there is simply no reason to struggle over determining which, if any,
directors are independent. Two exceptions, however, should be made
to the proposed rule as above stated. First, if the action against all
defendant directors is dismissed, then the board should be allowed to
reassume its traditional role in any remaining action against unrelated
third parties. Second, if the composition of the board is changed so
that no defendants remain a member and that change occurs under
objective circumstances which indicate an end of the influence of
prior management (e.g., a hostile takeover or a victory by insurgents
in a proxy fight), then the new board should assume control of the
suit. 3° 4 In either of these two cases, the plaintiff shareholder should

be required to turn the suit over to the board for a determination of
whether or not to pursue the litigation.
302. One potential difficulty occurs if the plaintiff sues the directors for allegedly violating their
duty of care by not suing an unrelated third party. See, eg., Klotz v. Consolidated Edison Co., 386
F. Supp. 577 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). By and large, however, because of the business judgment rule such
allegations are properly held not to state a cause of action. Guidance as to when a party has a
relationship with a board member sufficient to preclude the exercise of unbiased judgment may be
found in cases in which transactions with related parties have been attacked. See generally 3 W.
FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §§ 941-47 (rev. ed. 1975).
303. See Bayne, A Flaw in the Law: The Demand Rule: A Brief, 22 ST. Louis U. L.J. 69, 80

(1978).
304. See, eg., Brody v. Chemical Bank, 517 F.2d 932 (2d Cir. 1975).
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Given the altered role of the board, the initial prerequisite of a
demand on the directors can also be restructured. For the most part,
it can be abolished as an unnecessary source of confusion. To the
extent that a shareholder feels the corporation should prosecute a
claim against an unrelated third party, the shareholder is perfectly
free to request that the board do so. However, there is no point in
continuing the roundabout demand-refusal procedure to determine
that a derivative suit would be inappropriate in this context. When
the action is against members of the board, the directors should not be
able to prevent the plaintiff shareholder from undertaking the action
whether or not they wish to pursue the claim. 30 5 Moreover, if the
board desires to initiate a suit on behalf of the corporation, it can
always do so without a demand being made. Thus, there is no reason
to require a demand on the board to sue any of its members. The only
case in which a demand may be useful is when corrective action is
possible short of a suit. For example, the plaintiff might demand that
the board rescind a purportedly unfair transaction which has not yet
gone into effect. A demand requirement could therefore be retained
in any case in which corrective action, short of a lawsuit, would
achieve the plaintiff's legitimate objectives. If such a requirement is
retained, it should be reduced to an easily applied, mechanical rule
even at the expense of being overinclusive or underinclusive. Given
the lack of burden on the plaintiff to make the demand, on the one
hand, and the fact that the board could always take corrective action
after the suit is filed, on the other, it hardly makes sense to spend
much time continuing to litigate over this subject.
This proposal also means substantially curtailing the decisionmaking power of the plaintiff shareholder. He or she will continue to
make the initial determination to undertake the suit. After that, however, it will be up to the provisional litigation directors to make the
major decisions for the corporation. It might be protested that this
turns the plaintiff into merely "the key to the courthouse" 30 6 and creates a strange situation in which a litigant cannot control his or her
own attorney in the handling of the lawsuit. That may well be true,
but there is nothing wrong with this result. The plaintiff is bringing
the suit on behalf of the corporation, not for any personal claim. This
305. Scott, Corporation Law & The American Law Institute Corporate Governance Project, 35
STAN. L. REv. 927, 944 (1983) ("the most probable reason for the board to want to take over a suit
[against some of its members] would be to undermine it").
306. Saylor v. Lindsley, 456 F.2d 886, 899 (2d Cir. 1972).
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fact places the plaintiff shareholder in a position analogous to that of
guardians ad litem, whose actions are not under their own unlimited
control. 30 7 Indeed, restrictions on the derivative plaintiff's power over
voluntary dismissal and settlement have long been accepted. Moreover, it is the plaintiff's attorney, not the plaintiff, that typically takes
charge of a derivative suit. This is one of the facts that creates the
need for provisional litigation directors.
One exception should be made to completely curtailing the decisionmaking power of the plaintiff shareholder (or his or her attorney)
after the suit is filed. An escape valve must exist whenever a decision
by the provisional litigation directors would have the effect of substantially increasing the plaintiff's financial burden beyond that which
was originally contemplated. Perhaps by working with the panel, the
plaintiff shareholder can find additional interested shareholders who
can be substituted or added as parties. If none can be found, it may be
necessary to allow the suit to be abandoned. Otherwise, shareholders
(or their attorneys) may be deterred from bringing meritorious derivative actions by the prospect of giving court-appointed strangers a
blank check.
The court's role in determining the corporate interest will also be
substantially limited. The review of directors' decisions to dismiss
outlined in Zapata will no longer be necessary, and court review of
settlement agreements should be considerably streamlined. These decisions will all be made by the provisional litigation directors, and
court review of their decisions should be limited to considering any
charges of bad faith. Barring the establishment of such charges, the
panel's decision should be final. This is much like the deferential approach currently used by some courts in reviewing recommendations
of special litigation committees. 308 Here, such a standard is justified
by the independence built into the selection process.
Finally, there will be no role for shareholder votes with respect to
litigation decisions. Shareholder ratification of the underlying transaction may be a defense on the merits if so provided by substantive
law. 30 9 That subject is not addressed by this proposal. However,
there is no point in requiring the plaintiff shareholder to demand ac307. Eg., Whitten v. Dabney, 171 Cal. 621, 154 P. 312 (1915).
308. See supra note 30 and cases cited therein.
309. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 310(a) (West 1982); DEL. GEN. CORP. LAW § 144(a)(2)
(1983); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 713(a)(2) (McKinney 1963 & Supp. 1984-85); Smith v. BrownBorhek Co., 414 Pa. 325, 200 A.2d 398 (1964).
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tion from the stockholders as a whole, 310 nor should the defendants be
able to turn to the shareholders for litigation decisions.
IV. CONCLUSION
Throughout its history, the derivative suit has troubled the
courts. Typically, the problem with the derivative action is laid at the
door of the so-called strike suit. Yet, the strike suit is at most a symptom of the problem and often only a phantom conjured up by defense
counsel who seek to avoid resolution of the merits. 311 To tame this
perceived danger, courts and legislatures have enacted ever-increasing
procedural barriers around the derivative suit, including the posting
of security for expenses, the contemporaneous ownership rule,312 and
the requirement of demand on directors and shareholders. The result
has been only to sidetrack the litigation into a seemingly interminable
morass of pretrial maneuvering.
It is time to identify and correct the real problem with derivative
suits. The underlying difficulty is that no one, under the approaches
currently used, truly represents the corporation's interest. The directors and the plaintiff shareholder suffer from conflicts of interest.
Turning to the courts or uninvolved shareholders for resolution is impractical. A court-appointed panel of independent third parties,
charged with the responsibility of representing the corporate interest
in the litigation, is a potential solution to the dilemma. At the very
least, it is a solution which is worth a try.
310. While it might be argued that the shareholders could take some corrective action short of
a lawsuit or else replace the directors with individuals who would have the corporation sue (see Bell
v. Arnold, 175 Colo. 277, 487 P.2d 545 (1971)), this is not a realistic ground for imposing the burden
of making a demand. The probability of such an action occurring is slight.
311. W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, supra note 93, at 888.
312.

Under Rule 23.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and similar state laws, the deriv-

ative plaintiff must have owned shares at the time of the alleged wrongdoing or else have received his
or her shares by operation of law from someone who did. The purpose is to prevent the purchase of
shares in order to bring derivate actions. ALI Draft Principles, supra note 10, § 7.02 comment c.

